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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKs AND BANKING-BANK'S LIABILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN BREACH OF
TRUST-MISAPPROPRIATION By TRUSTSE-DEPosITOR.-The plaintiff, a surety com-
pany, sought to recover from five banks the amount of money which a receiver
bonded by it, had embezzled. The receiver, one of two appointed to operate the
business of a bankrupt manufacturing corporation, pursued a triangular course in his
defalcations. His method was to withdraw receivership funds by check from the
original bank and to deposit them in a second bank to his credit as "Receiver." A
second check, drawn to his personal order against this last named account and de-
posited in his personal account with the original bank, accomplished his purpose,-
the receivership funds in the original bank had been effectively "switched" from the
receivership account to his personal account. These funds he converted to his own
use. The plaintiff charged that the face of the checks and their size, coupled with
the "composite knowledge"! of the bank that the receiver was maneuvering receiver-
ship funds into his personal account, amounted to knowledge of such facts as to
constitute bad faith. On appeal from judgment for the defendants, held, that the
liability of the defendant banks is governed exclusively by statute2 and in the absence
of actual knowledge, the true test is bad faith. This the plaintiff has failed to prove.
Judgment affirmed. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. National Newark & Essex Bank-
ing Co., 175 Atl. 609 (N. J. Eq. 1934).
Once again the acts of a dishonest fiduciary raise the question of a bank's
liability to the cestui que trust for deposits misappropriated by the trustee. There
has been little difference of opinion on the broad fundamentals involved. All agree
that one who knowingly participates in a breach of trust or aids a fiduciary in
violating his duty, thereby renders himself liable to the cestui que trust.8 The difficult
problem has always been to determine what constitutes such a participation as to
render a bank liable. Should the bank derive some benefit or advantage from the
diversion, both the common law4 and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act0 would assess
liability against the bank. Participation would also result from a situation wherein
the bank has "actual notice or knowledge that the diversion was intended or was
being executed, and thereby becomes privy to it."'' But when the courts attempt to
construe what constitutes "notice" or "knowledge" there is a wide divergence of
opinion. New Jersey, the jurisdiction of the principal case, and those jurisdictions
1. The "composite knowledge" theory of the plaintiff was based upon the supposition
that if the knowledge of each bank employee were pieced together, a clear and complete
picture of the embezzlement would then be present. In denying the plaintiff's contention,
the court said: "The 'composite knowledge' theory of liability would be deserving of con-
sideration .... But bad faith cannot be predicated upon imputed knowledge of fragmentary
facts; it cannot be evolved from 'composite knowledge'.' New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
National Newark & Essex Banking Co., 175 AtI. 609, 618 (N. J. Eq. 1934).
2. N. J. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) tit. 222, § 23a (7), (9).
3. 1 PERRY, TRusTs (7th ed. 1929) § 122; BOcERT, TRusTs (1921) 452; Scott, Par-
ticipation in a Breach of Trust (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 454.
4. Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916 (1912); Bischoff v.
Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. 106, 112 N. E. 759 (1916); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat.
Bank of Wichita Falls, 74 S. W. (2d) 661 (Tex. Civ. Appeals 1934); Midland Bank, Ltd.
v. Reckitt, [19331 A. C. 1.
5. UNIFORm Fmuciuxs AcT § 7.
6. Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. 106, 112, 112 N. E. 759, 761 (1916).
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which have adopted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act,7 have definitely settled this
perplexing problem by limiting the liability of the bank to instances of actual knowl-
edge or bad faith. In other jurisdictions, instead of being based upon some positive
rule of law, the decisions of the different courts seem swayed more by the exigencies
and practical difficulties involved in the situation.8 As a result, the judicial world
has been split into two camps, one granting immunity to banks dealing with deposits
of fiduciaries,9 and the other imposing liability on them'0 Were the law of each
jurisdiction thus definitely settled, there would be no cause for complaint, but when
New York, the jurisdiction in which the question is of paramount importance by
reason of the vast number of transactions taking place therein,"1 has left doubt
as to the law, then it is time that the legislature should determine the policy of
the state. The trend of its decisions has been from charging the bank with con-
structive notice from the form of the check, when drawn to the personal order of
the fiduciary and signed by him in his fiduciary capacity,' 2 to the rule of Bischoff v.
Yorkville Bank,13 which cut down this broad principle, apparently disregarding the
form of the check, and charging the bank with constructive notice, only from and
after the moment that the deposit was used to pay the personal debt of the fiduciary
7. The table given in 9 UmiroaRm L.%ws, AmmOravm (Supp. 1934) 38, lists as having
adopted the act: Colorado, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Loui'iana, Ary-
land, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wizconsin
and Wyoming.
8. "The cases imposing liability in such circumstances lay down, however, a strict and
at times a harsh rule, and are not to be extended .... The transactions of banting in a
great financial center are not to be dogged, and their pace slackened, by over-burdensome
restrictions.' Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N. Y. 394, 405, 138 N. E. 33, 37 (1923).
9. Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 274 U. S. 473 (1927); Santa Marina Co. v. Canadian
Bank of Commerce, 254 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918); Allen v. Puritan Trust Co, 211
Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916 (1912); Rodgers v. Bankers' Nat. Bank, 179 Minn. 197, 229
N. W. 90 (1930); Board of County Com'rs v. State Nat. Bank of Idabel, 36 P. (2d) 281
(Sup. Ct. Okla. 1934); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Home Bank for Saving-, 77 W.
Va. 665, SS S. E. 109 (1916); Corporations Agencies, Limited v. Home Bank of Canada,
[1927] A. C. 318. See Merrill, Bankers' Liabil'ty for Deposits of a Fiduciary to His
Personal Account (1927) 40 HARV. L. REv. 1077; 2 PATo"s DiGEST 1425.
10. Bank of Hickory v. McPherson, 102 Mliss. 852, 59 So. 934 (1912); U. S. Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. People's Bank, 127 Tenn. 720, 157 S. W. 414 (1913). See Merrill,
loc. cit. supra note 9.
11. According to the latest figures available, New York leads the country in the amount
of money in banks on deposit. The deposits in all banks in that state amounted to
thirteen billions of dollars, or more than 28 per cent of thirty-eight billions of dollars, the
total deposits in all of the banks in the whole country. The state having the second largest
deposits is Massachusetts, with three billions of dollars. See 20 FsnmaL REnavE BuLz.-rr
52 (1934).
12. Havana Central R. R. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 193'N. Y. 422, 92 N. E. 12
(1910), stands for the proposition that although the form of the check put the bank of
deposit on notice, such duty of inquiry was satisfied, when the check was presented for
collection to the drawee bank. An acceptance of the check by the drawee bank and a
reliance on such acceptance by the bank of deposit effectively estopped the principal from
denying the authority of the fiduciary to draw checks to his personal order.
13. 218 N. Y. 106, 112 N. E. 759 (1916). This case proceeded on the theory that the
transfer of trust funds from the account of the principal to that of the fiduciary was within
the scope and power of the fiduciary and that the bank had the right to presume that the
fiduciary would apply the funds to their proper purpose under the trust. However, from
the moment that the fiduciary's personal account (which at the time was wholly compozed
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to the bank.14 Subsequently this rule of constructive notice was re-enlarged to
include those cases wherein the bank of deposit credited the personal account of
the fiduciary with cashiers' checks drawn to the order of the principal and endorsed
in the name of the principal by the fiduciary, and then by him endorsed personally
and deposited to his personal account.15 The most recent development in New
York is set forth in Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co.,10 which absolves the bank
of deposit where the check accepted for deposit has been certified by the drawee
bank.17 Here, from the very form of the checks deposited, the banks should have
known that the funds were indelibly impressed with a trust character. Thus there is
a return to a softening of emphasis on form.' 8 Through the network of decisions
in New York one might trace an inclination towards freeing the banks of liability
in this respect. The pattern is still too indefinite to warrant placing practical
reliance upon it.1
Since the problem seems to be one of policy, rather than one of law, it might be
well to consider some of the economic arguments. Those who would grant im-
munity to the bank advance the argument that any other rule would require that the
bank closely examine each check offered for deposit, thus hindering the conduct of
of trust funds) was used to pay a personal debt owing to the bank, the bank might be
presumed to have had conclusive knowledge that the fiduciary had appropriated trust funds
for his personal benefit. This knowledge imposed a duty on the bank to make reasonable
inquiry.
14. As a sequel to this case, the legislature passed § 231 of the Surrogates Court Act
which made it a misdemeanor for a trustee to deposit trust funds in his personal account.
This statute, however, has in no way changed the rule of Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, supra.
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. U. S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 244 N. Y. 50, 155 N. E.
893 (1926).
15. Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park Nat. Bk., 228 N. Y. 37, 126 N. E. 347 (1920).
The theory underlying the decision of the court in this case, was that the fiduciary had
no authority to indorse checks in behalf of the principal, for the purpose of applying the
proceeds to his personal use. Having no authority, he could not transfer any greater
right than he possessed, to his agent for collection. Contra: Santa Marina Co. v. Canadian
Bank of Commerce, 254 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
16. 234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33 (1923).
17. The court would regard this situation in substantially the same light as if the
fiduciary had obtained payment of the check and had deposited the proceeds with the
bank of deposit. It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court has
adopted the New York rule in reference to certified checks. Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan,
274 U. S. 473 (1927).
18. See Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N. Y. 394, 402, 138 N. E. 33, 36.
19. An examination of the form of corporate resolutions in current use, representing the
contract of deposit between the bank and its customer, reveals the extent to which the
banks are going to obtain specific authorization, rather than to trust to the wisdom of the
law. As an example of this, the following is one of the clauses found in a form of
corporate resolution, issued by one of the leading banks in New York: "RESOLVED, that
the Bank is hereby authorized to pay any such instrument or make any such charge and
also to receive the same from the payee or any other holder without inqudry as to the
circumstances of issue or the disposition of the proceeds even if drawn to the individual
order of any signing person, or payable to said Bank or others for his account, or tendered
in-payment of his individual obligation, and whether drawn against an account in the name
of this corporation or in the name of any officer or agent of this corporation as such."
(Italics not in original).
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the banking business. 2o The answer to this argument is that the banking world has
always required the teller, when examining the check, to note the depositor, the
payee and the endorsement. 21 As a matter of ordinary bank routine, the teller must
question any check which is made payable to a fiduciary personally and signed or
endorsed by him in a fiduciary capacity. A responsible officer of the bank must then
verify whether there is a specific authorization on file covering such act. If there is
not, the bank must institute proper inquiry. It is submitted that this type of
inquiry is desirable in safeguarding trust funds. Any relaxation of the rule might
result in frequent repetition of instances similar to the principal case.
BANxs-SPEcAL DEPosrTs-TPANsmIssioN oF FUNDs.-The plaintiffs delivered
money and checks to the defendant bank with instructions to deposit equivalent
sums of lire in the Postal Savings Bank in Italy, paying in addition a small charge
for the service. On each occasion the plaintiffs received a receipt to the effect that
a specific number of lire had been deposited in their favor. The defendant bank
then sent instructions by mail to its Naples correspondent to make such deposits.
When the superintendent of banks took charge of the defendant bank be counter-
manded the instructions before these deposits were made. The plaintiffs claim to be
preferred creditors of the bank, on the theory that the bank was their agent or
trustee. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiffs, held, that the transactions in
question constituted sales of the bank's credit and that no trust relationship was
established. Judgment reversed. Two justices dissented. lajolla v. M. Bcrardini
State Bank, 242 App. Div. 571, 275 N. Y. Supp. 748 (lst Dep't 1934).
The instant case is typical of a class of cases which has given rise to many
irreconcilable decisions. This is owing in part to the failure of the courts to place
the transaction correctly within one of the three possible categories: (1) general
deposit, (2) general deposit for a special purpose, (3) special deposit.' Since, upon
the insolvency of a bank, only the special depositor is entitled to a preference over
the general creditors,2 it is frequently essential to determine the precise nature of the
transaction. In view of banking custom it has been held that a presumption exists
that money deposited in a bank is a general deposit, constituting the bank a debtor
with title and right to use the money as its own.3 The courts are not in accord
20. See note 8, supra.
21. See Merrill, supra note 9, at 1093.
1. 1 MoRsE, B.xxs iAw B&_nxo (6th ed. 1928) § 186; Baker, Bank Depos ts and
Collections (1912), 11 McH. L. REv. 124; (1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 32S.
2. Woodhouse v. Crandall, 191 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902); Shopert v. Indiana Nat.
Bank, 41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515 (1903); People v. City Bank of RXocheter, 96 N. Y.
32 (1884); Stoll v. Meade County Bank of Sturgis, 39 S. D. 136, 163 N. W. 565 (1917);
Carlson v. Kies, 75 Wash. 171, 134 Pac. 80S (1913).
3. "The banker being engaged in a business whose very existence depends on the cus-
tomary and rightful use of funds intrusted to him, as the banker's own, and the universal
custom in practice being the use of such funds as the banker's own and their trans-
mission by a system of redits, only the ordinary presumption that funds received for
account of another are held in a fiduciary capacity should not apply." Stone, Some Legal
Problems Involved in the Transrission of Funds (1921) 21 Co.. L. REv. 507, 514. John
L. Walker Co. v. Alden, 6 F. Supp. 262 (E. D. Ill. 1934) ; Hjelle v. Velgel, 169 Minn. 173,
210 N. W. 891 (1926); Busher v. Fulton, 128 Ohio St. 485, 191 N. E. 752 (1934). 1 Monsr,
op. cit. supra note 1.
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as to the requisites for overcoming this presumption. 4 The ultimate test of the
relationship is the duty imposed upon the bank, and not what the bank actually
does with the money.5 Like all contractual obligations, that duty is determined by
the mutual intention and understanding of the parties, considered in the light of
surrounding circumstances.0 If the parties intend a sale of the bank's credit or
intend that the bank shall have the right to commingle the money with its general
funds, merely establishing the bank an agent under contract to transmit its credit
to another, the bank becomes a debtor, and upon its insolvency the depositor becomes
a general creditor.8 On the other hand, if the agreement is that the identical sum
deposited or an equivalent amount shall be kept intact from the general funds of the
bank and shall be applied for the designated purpose, a special deposit is effected.0
In such case, whether the relationship be viewed as that of bailor-bailee or settlor-
4. Liberal view: A trust relationship arises when the bank knowingly accepts deposits
for a specific purpose. Montagu v. Pacific Bank, 81 Fed. 602 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1897);
Bryan v. Cocoanut Grove Bank & Trust Co., 101 Fla. 947, 132 So. 481 (1931); Salzburger
Bank v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Ga. 722, 161 S. E. 584 (1931); Ryan v. Phillips, 3 Kan. App.
704, 44 Pac. 909 (1896); Winkler v. Veigel, 176 Minn. 384, 223 N. W. 622 (1929).
Strict view: In order to have a trust relationship, the parties must agree that the funds
deposited or their equivalent are to be segregated from the general funds. First Nat. Bank
v. City of Miami, 69 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Borgess Hospital v. Union In-
dustrial Trust & Savings Bank, 265 Mich. 156, 251 N. W. 363 (1933). The fact that the
receipt states that the bank is to act as "agent" does not of itself stamp the transaction
fiduciary as distinguished from debtor-creditor, since the legal effect thereof may create
merely a contract obligation. Beecher v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 239 Mass. 48, 131 N. E.
338 (1921). See also (1928) 13 Coar. L. Q. 603.
5. Wiggins v. Stevens, 33 App. Div. 83, 53 N. Y. Supp. 90 (4th dep't 1898); Smith v.
Fuller, 86 Ohio St. 57, 99 N. E. 214 (1912); Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45,
123 S. E. 379 (1924). For the requisites for identification in the hands of an insolvent
bank, see BoaERT, TRUSTS (1921) 527 et seq.
6. A bank deposit is subject to any agreement which the depositor and banker may
make with regard to it, so long as the rights of third parties are not injuriously affected.
Tinsley v. Amos, 102 Fla. 1, 135 So. 397 (1931); Harrison v. Harrison, 118 Ind. 179, 20
N. E. 746 (1889); Newburgh Nat. Bank v. Smith, 66 N. Y. 271 (1876); BOOERT, TRUSTS
(1921) 23; Stone, supra note 3, at 521.
7. See note 12, infra.
6. Fralick v. Coeur D'Alene Bank & Trust Co., 36 Idaho 108, 210 Pac. 586 (1922);
Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Jacobs, 141 Ill. 261, 31 N. E. 414 (1892); Cline v. Union Trust
Co., 189 N. E. 643 (Ind. App. Ct. 1934); Taussig v. Carnegie Trust Co., 156 App. Div.
519, 141 N. Y. Supp. 347, aff1'd, 213 N. Y. 627, 107 N. E. 1086 (1914); 1 MORSE, Op. Ct.
supra note 1.
9. RESTATE MENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft, 1930) § 15 comment H; 1 MoRsE, op. cit. 31pra
note 3, § 183-5. It is not essential to a special deposit that the money be "earmarked,"
provided an equivalent amount is so held. Genesee Wesleyan Seminary v. U. S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 247 N. Y. 52, 159 N. E. 720 (1928). The purposes of special deposits are
varied: Shopert v. Indiana Nat. Bank, 41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515 (1908) (to await
closing of sale); Lamb v. Ladd, 112 Kan. 26, 209 Pac. 825 (1922) (to await fulfillment
of a contract); People v. City Bank, 96 N. Y. 32 (1884) (for payment of debt to third
person); People ex rel. Zotti v. Flynn, 135 App. Div. 276, 120 N. Y. Supp. 511 (1st Dep't
1909) (transmission of funds).
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trustee,' 0 the status of the depositor is that of a preferred creditor." The true
intention of the parties is usually difficult of ascertainment because of the vagueness
of the ordinary transaction. Frequently, the courts will seize upon some word in
the receipt given by the bank as evidencing their actual understanding.' 2 More often
speculation by the court is the sole determinant since the transaction is open to
either interpretation. The English courts solve the problem by presuming a knowl-
edge in the depositor of banking principles and customs and treat money deposited
with a bank for transmission in the usual course of business as effectuating a debtor-
creditor relationship unless the clearest terms are used to show that a bailment or
trust was contemplated. 13 This rule appears to be sound and its advantage as a
definite norm in arriving at a consistent solution of these cases must be conceded.
CONFLICT OF LAwS-RECOGNITION OF CoNFIsCAToRY DECREES OF FOPnxG:
GovERNMENT.-The defendant life insurance company was permitted to operate in
Russia prior to 1917 by virtue of laws of the Imperial Government known as the
Policy Rules (Pravila) which were made part of all policies of life insurance issued
there. These rules directed that the defendant should keep in Russia assets to more
than meet the liabilities incurred on the policies issued; that all disputes which might
arise in connection with the insurance operations carried on by the defendant in
Russia should be settled according to Russian law and in Russian courts; that the
government could cancel the defendant's right to do business in Russia and direct the
manner of settlement of its accounts; that all payments and obligations should be
expressed in Russian currency; that the defendant should pledge all its assets,
wherever located, as a guarantee of its obligations on the Russian policies. Subse-
quently the House of Romanoff was overthrown and by November of 1917 the
Bolshevik revolutionists had seized control of Russian affairs. In December 1918 all
life insurance was declared a state monopoly and the defendant's assets in Russia
were confiscated by the Soviet government. By decrees of November 18, 1919 all
life insurance contracts were annulled and cancelled. No compensation was given
policyholders including the plaintiffs, most of whom were no longer within Russian
territory. On January 1, 1920 the defendant in New York authorized acts which it
was assumed amounted to repudiation of the Russian policies, but the plaintiffs did
not learn of this repudiation until after 1925. The instant decision was rendered
in connection with twenty-six test cases, the majority of which were brought on
the theory of an election to rescind the contracts, because of the repudiation, as of
the date suit was instituted against the Society for a return of premiums with
interest thereon. The plaintiffs asked for a dollar judgment based upon conversion
of rubles into dollars at the exchange rates prevailing on the date of payment of
10. The relationship arising from special deposits has been called "trust", "bailment or
trust", "fiduciary relationship" and "fund impressed with a trust". (1928) 13 Corua. L. Q.
603.
11. See cases cited note 2 supra.
12. Beecher v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 239 Mass. 48, 131 N. E. 338 (1921) ("sold to");
Legniti v. Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank, 230 N. Y. 415, 130 N. _. 597 (1921) ("bought
of"); Saflan v. Irving Nat. Bank, 202 App. Div. 459, 196 N. Y. Supp. 141, aJ'd, 236 N. Y.
513, 142 N. E. 264 (1922) ("purchaser", "sold to"); Matter of Littman, 258 N. Y. 463,
IS0 N. E. 174 (1932) ("purchaser").
13. Wlliam v. Everett, 14 East 582, 104 Eng. Reprints 725 (1811); Grant v. Austin, 3
Price 58, 146 Eng. Reprints 191 (1816); Wedlake v. Hurley, 1 Cr. & Jer. 83, 148 Eng. Re-
prints 1344 (1830); Hill v. Smith, 12 M. & W. 618, 152 Eng. Reprints 1346 (1844); I. re
Earned's Banking Co., 39 L. J. 635 (Ch. I869).
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premiums, but the lower courts gave a recovery treating the date of conversion
as the date of election to rescind, but using exchange rates existing on the dates of
payment of premiums. On appeal, held, the defendant's obligation on the policies
had been cancelled by the Soviet government and the plaintiffs had no right to
recover anything. Judgment reversed. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, (and twenty-five other cases against the same defendant), 266 N. Y. 71,
193 N. E. 897 (1934). 1
It was a foregone conclusion that the establishment of the radically novel
Marx-Engels-Lenin system of government in Russia would cause serious difficulty to
foreign tribunals when the application of Soviet laws to the rights of litigants before
the forum was involved. In this country the courts of New York2 have borne the
brunt of the litigation, and the instant case is interesting as apparently marking a
divergence by the court from the previous opinions of the germane problems.8
It is well established that the forum litis will not enforce a right created by a
foreign law that is contrary to the public policy of the forum. However, the pertinent
question in the instant case was whether the forum should enforce a vested contract
right, although that right had been declared to be extinguished by the law of Russia
under which the right had been created, on the ground that it would be in violation
of the public policy of the forum to recognize the confiscatory decrees of the Soviet
government that ordered its cancellation. Although since recognition of the Soviet
Republic by the United States4 our courts, by the comity of nations, might regard
Soviet laws as valid extra-territorially,5 still our courts do not have to recognize
such of their laws as are contrary to our public policy.0 It is true that in the
instant case the fact that the parties agreed that disputes under the contract should
be decided by Russian law always overshadowed the plaintiff's claim and finally
worked its doom under the interpretation adopted by the court, but the result reached
rested on unsatisfactory premises. First, because the parties would never have
intended to arrive at such a result by the force of their contract alone--they meant
1. For the purposes of this note only the questions involved in the rescission cases
will be considered. A majority of 5 judges found that the obligation of the defendant had
been cancelled, but that assuming it had not there could still be no recovery by plaintiffs
because the rubles they claimed were valueless; the remaining 2 judges were of the opinion
-that the court should not recognize the Soviet confiscatory decrees and that the defendant's
obligation still existed, but concurred in the result because of the currency situation.
Reargument of the cases was denied, N. Y. L. J., March 6, 1935, at 1156.
2. Many of the cases are analyzed in, Dickstein, Recognition Cases 1925-1930, (1931)
25 Am. J. INT. L. 214. See also, Habicht, The Application of Soviet Laws and the
Exception of Public Order, (1927) 21 Am. J. INT. L. 238.
3. The lower courts presumed that it was settled that in a case such as the Instant
*case the New York courts must refuse to recognize the confiscatory decrees of the Soviet
government. See also, Note (1934) 89 A. L. R. 351; Untermeyer, Judicial Interpretation
of Soviet Decrees (1933) 1 Go. WVAsu. L. Rzv. 471, 479.
4. The United States' Department of State formally recognized the Soviet Government
on November 16, 1933, (1934) 28 Am. 3. INT. L. 90. Such recognition was retroactive
in effect. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250 (1897); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U. S. 297 (1918); Terrajas v. Holmes, 115 Tex. 32, 275 S. W. 392 (1925). Sea
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 223, 186 N. E. 679 (1933).
5. See Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 378, 189 N. E,
456, 460 (1934); Russian Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 257, 139 N. E. 259,
260 (1923).
6. 2 WHARTON, CoNtrucr oF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 467 (b). For the application of
this principle to insurance cases see, 1 JoYE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1917) §§ 231-a, 231-f.
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Russian law to govern performance and instead the confiscatory decrees destroyed
the contract without substituting anything in place thereof; 7 and second, the courts
of New York have declared it contrary to public policy to recognize Soviet con-
fiscatory s decrees that would result in cancellation of extra-territorial rights.0 It is
submitted that the Soviet government lacked jurisdiction to cancel the plaintiff's
rights and that therefore it should have been held contrary to New York public
policy to recognize that the plaintiff's contract was cancelled by Soviet law.
It appears that at the time of the decrees the Soviet government had apparently
no jurisdiction over many of the plaintiffs in the twenty-six test cases involved.
If it is borne in mind that the majority of the plaintiffs were emigres from Russia
at the time of the decree that cancelled their contracts, and are now citizens of
independent nations,' 0 then the argument of the majority of the court is irrelevant
when they say that it is not against public policy to hold the rights of "nationals" of
Russia could be destroyed by Soviet laws." It is difficult to understand how such
a view can be reconciled with previous cases refusing to recognize Soviet laws that
destroyed the rights of corporations organized under Russian laws.' 2 As to the
7. Mr. Justice Cardozo had in a previous case rejected the identical argument on thi
ground. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 170, 145 N. E. 917, 920-921 (1924).
8. The majority opinion speaks of these decrees as though they were not confscatory
but were part of some general social scheme, 266 N. Y. 71, 83-84, 193 N. E. 897, 90O. Cf.
concurring opinion, id. at 103, 193 N. E. at 911. However, the Referee had found that
the Soviet government cancelled all insurance contracts without paying anything in com-
pensation. 144 Misc. 363, 369, 259 N. Y. Supp. 146, 153 (Sup. Ct. 1932). These identical
decrees had previously been called confiscatory by the Court of Appeals. See Sliesberg
v. New York Life, 244 N. Y. 482, 499, 155 N. E. 749, 755 (1927); and by the English
courts, First Russian Insurance Co. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., [1928] 1 Ch. 922, 953.
9. The cases preceding recognition of the Soviet Republic, among which were, Sokoloff
v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924); James & Co. v. Second
Russian Insurance Co., 239 N. Y. 243, 146 N. E. 369 (1928); and Sliosbrg v. New York
Life, 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749 (1927), refused to recognize the extra-territorial validity
of Soviet law basing their decisions upon the fact of non-recoguition as well as on the
theory that the decrees were contrary to public policy. Professor Borchard reasoned that
the rule of public policy should be the criterion and that otherwise the acts of a de facto
government both within and without its territory should be recognized. The Unrecognized
Government in American Cozwts (1932) 26 A. J. IrT. L. 261. New York courts may not
have gone the length of agreeing with this argument in toto, but in Salimoff & Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933) it was held that prior to recognition
of the Soviet government as a de jure government, New York would recognize confiscatory
decrees that destroyed rights existing solely in Russia. Then Vladikavkaz-ky Ry. v. X, w
York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934) came after recognition of the
Soviet Republic, and apparently had settled the question that any confiscatory decrees
that cancelled rights outside of Russia are contrary to public policy of New York and
would not be enforced; that case went so far as to say that the cases decided prior to
recognition were based on this theory.
10. See instant case, 238 App. Div. 696, 700, 265 N. Y. Supp. 714, 716 (1st Dep't 1933).
11. It is on this point primarily that the concurring opinion in the instant case
disagrees with that of the majority. This fact also distinguishes the instant case from
Sliosberg v. New York Life, 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 479 (1927), because in that case
the insured was in Russia at the time of the decree; but in quoting from Sliosberg v.
New York Life, spra, the majority opinion fails to notice this distinction, see 266 N. Y.
71, 89, 193 N. E. 897, 903.
12. James & Co. v. Second Russin Insurance Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369 (1925);
1935]
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defendant, it is doubtful if there was even a technical residence in Russia at the
time the decrees professed to cancel the contracts.13 However, it has been held that
New York need not recognize the confiscatory cancellation of liabilities by Russian
law when assets of the debtor are available in New York.14
If the Soviet government had no adequate jurisdiction in personam, the more
difficult problem remains whether the situs of the plaintiff's obligation was under
Soviet jurisdiction. Had the situs been solely in Russia then admittedly New York
courts might regard the Soviet decrees as having jurisdiction to cancel the con-
tracts.15 However, if the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam has any force, these
rights must have had a situs with the plaintiffs wherever they had fled. 10 For some
purposes at least the obligations had also a situs with the defendant.17 The instant
case in this respect is all the more surprising when read in conjunction with Sllosberg
v. New York Life Insurance's which held that identically similar obligations had
their source and sanction under New York law. That case established the fact that
independent of Soviet law, the law of New York had recognized the existence of
these contracts and had given them the stamp of its approval and protection.
Therefore it cannot be denied that the instant case made effective in New York
the Soviet decrees which of their own vigor could have had no adequate jurisdiction
or power to compel the cancellation of obligations enforceable by New York law.19
Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930);
Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934). Cf.
Russian Reinsurance v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925); Severnoc Securities
Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co. Ltd., 255 N. Y. 120, 174 N. E. 299 modified, .255
N. Y. 631, 175 N. E. 345 (1931).
13. The Soviet government had dosed the Equitable's offices in Russia and taken over
its affairs in 1918. See the instant case, 144 Misc. 363, 369, 259 N. Y. Supp. 146, 153-154.
Therefore since the decree cancelling the plaintiffs' contracts did not occur until 1919 It
seems very doubtful whether the defendant could still have been deemed to have any
residence in Russia at the time. This situation was commented upon in Sokoloff v.
National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 169, 145 N. E. 917, 920 (1924).
14. "As to the Soviet decree, we think its attempted extinguishment of liabilities Is
brutum fulmen, in England as well as here, and this whether the government attempting it
has been recognized or not. Russia might terminate the liability of Russian corporations
in Russian courts or under Russian law. Its fiat to that effect could not constrain the
courts of other sovereignties, if assets of the debtor were available for seizure In the
jurisdiction of the forum." James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., 239 N. Y.
248, at 257, 146 N. E. 369, at 371 (1925).
15. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220,' 186 N. E. 679 (1933). Cf.
Luther v. Sagor, [1921J 3 K. B. 532.
16. RESTATE=NT, Coz.mcT oF LAWS (1934) § 51.
17. See Severnoe Securities Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co. Ltd., 255 N. Y.
120, 123, 174 N. E. 299, 300 (1931).
18. 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749, cert. denied, 275 U. S. 526 (1927). That case In-
volved contracts of life insurance issued by the New York Life Insurance Co. in Russia
similar to the contracts in the instant case and subject to the same Russian Policy Rules.
The case held that these contracts were protected under the contract clause of the United
States Constitution, and declared unconstitutional a statute of New York that amounted to
a substantial impairment of a means of enforcing the obligations in New York. See note
22, infra.
19. See Sliosberg v. New York Life, 244 N. Y. 482, 493-495, 155 N. E. 749, 753-754
(1925). "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . . " McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U. S. 90, 91 (1917); Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts, (1918) 31 HARe.. L. RV.
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The majority of the court apparently distinguished Sliosbcrg v. New Yorl Life
Insurance on the ground that that case did not mean that contracts like thosd in-
volved in this case were not to be construed under Russian law, and that the Russian
law having cancelled them the defendant's obligations no longer existed. It is sub-
mitted, that rather the answer should have been that the defendant was pleading
discharge from its obligations by virtue of a foreign law that was contrary to the
public policy of the forum20 and not recognized there.2 1
The decision is understandable, however, on the ground that it was not contrary
to the public policy 22 of New York to recognize the cancellation of the particular
obligations in question because the New Yorlk Legislature, a primary guide to the
public policy of the state, had implied that effect should be given in New York to
these Soviet decrees as affecting these life insurance contracts.P Furthermore, the
Equitable is a mutual company,2 4 and to have granted the plaintiffs' claims would
have forced the American policy holders to make good the losseses occasioned by a
Russian revolution, for the sole benefit of former Russians.26
905. Cf. Security Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282 (1923) cited by the majority opinion
in the instant case but clearly distinguishable on its facts.
However, the result of the instant case is in accord with the English courts' views.
Perry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, [1929] 45 T. L. R. 468. Cf. Buerger v. New
York Life Insurance, [1927] 43 T. L. R. 601.
20. See note 9, supra.
21. Well indeed might the concurring opinion remark: "Thus every claim that
been urged by the defendant and is sustained in the opinion of Judge Crane, has been
rejected by previous decisions of this court. It has been rejected by the actual decisions."
266 N. Y. 71, 109, 193 N. E. 897, 911.
22. The court has expressed the following rule as to public policy, in an analogous
case involving Soviet decrees: 'We give or deny the effect of law to decrees or acts of a
foreign governmental establishment in accordance with our own public policy; we open
or dose our courts to foreign corporations according to our public policy, and in deter-
minig our public policy in these matters common sense and justice must be considerations
of weight" Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 163-1642 147 N. E. 703,
707 (1925).
23. Chapter 232 Laws of 1926 of New York, § 169-a New York Civil Practice Act,
provided, in effect, that if any action were brought in New York on these Ru ian life
insurance policies, a stay should be granted by the court until 30 days after the United
States recognized the Soviet government. The intention of the Legislature apparently was
that Soviet law should be recognized by the courts as applicable to these contracts, after
political recognition of the Soviet Republic by the United States. For the reason stated
in note 18, supra, this statute was declared unconstitutional.
24. See, Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 194 N. Y. 212, 218, 87 N. E. 443,
445 (1909).
25. There were apparently a total of some 6,0DO claims aggregating about $20,00,0O0.
Colacu.m & FnsAxc=zsz CmHoscrX (January 5, 1935) 55.
Paradoical as it seems, from the viewpoint of the members of the Equitable Society
a contrary result in this case would amount to giving extra-territorial effect to Rusian
confiscation, because the net result would then have been that American policy holdeds
property in America would ultimately have gone to replace the assets which represented
the premiums plaintiffs were seeking to be returned to them, and which had been seized
by the Soviet government in Russia. It was indeed a difficult situation in which the
equities lay with the defendant.
26. Another problem, and one perhaps of greater practical importance, was settled
by the instant case. By way of dictum the court decided [contrary to the result reached
1935]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-POWER OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH FOR COMPLETED CON-
TEMPT.-A petition for habeas corpus was brought against the sergeant-at-arms of
the Senate.' The petitioner was served with a subpoena duces tecumo returnable
before a Senate investigating committee. Subsequent to the service, but prior to the
return date of the subpoena, he permitted the removal from his files of certain
papers which had been requisitioned by the committee. Upon his refusal to appear
before the bar of the Senate, he was taken into custody by the sergeant-at-arms.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the judgment of the
trial court and ordered his discharge from custody.2 On certiorari, held, that where
the act complained of obstructs the legislative process, the power to punish extends
to a completed contempt. Judgment reversed. Jurney v. MacCracken, 293 U. S.
-, 55 Sup. Ct. 375 (1935).
It is commonly recognized that a legislature in order to properly discharge its
duties, must possess an adequate means of acquiring facts.$ The instrumentality
usually employed for this purpose, is the investigating committee clothed with
authority to subpoena persons and papers.4 Where an individual who has been
in Matter of People (First Russian Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 428, 175 N. E. 118 (1931)] that
an obligation incurred in Russian rubles of the pre-1924 issues is valuelesm in terms of
dollars when the date of conversion into dollars is subsequent to 1924 (New York apparently
uses the so-called "date of breach" doctrine, Rifkind, Money as a Device for Measuring
Value, (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 559). This decision was reached primarily because the
Russian ruble of today is (and has been since 1923), as different a currency from the
old ruble as if it bore a new name, and the rate of conversion, in Russia, of former issues
of rubles into the contemporary ruble is so small as to render the former practically value-
less. [In addition to the detailed account of the Soviet currency laws given in the instant
case, 266 N. Y. 71, 90-96, 193 N. E. 897, 903-906, see BARu0Ns FINAxcIAL WEEKLY (October
17, 1932) 20; HANDBOOK OF FOREIGN CURRENCY AND EXCIANOE, U. S. Dep't of Com-
merce (Promotion Series No. 102, 1930).] Since the plaintiffs could not prove that they
were entitled to rubles of any value at the date fixed for conversion they could not be
given any recovery in dollars. While Russian law does not adequately provide for
the conversion of obligations incurred in terms of old ruble patterns into the ruble of
the 1924 and subsequent issues, it is natural that the New York court should regard the
obligations themselves as valueless when the currency in which the obligations are expressed
is convertible into the medium of exchange existing at the date of conversion only at an
infinitesimally small rate of exchange. HAwTREY, CURaENCY AND CrrT (1928) 263.
1. Habeas Corpus is the proper action to test the jurisdiction of the Senate or House.
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927);
Ex parte Nugent, Fed. Cas. No. 10, 375 (C. C. D. C. 1848). In England the contempt
power of the houses of Parliament cannot be directly challenged by this procedure, but
is subject to collaterial review in a civil suit for damages. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad.
& E. 1, 112 Eng. Reprints 1112 (K. B. 1839); RAPAMJE, CoNTmn'IT (1884) 4; Potts, Power
of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926) 74 U. or PA. L. REv. 780, 785-6.
2. Two judges dissented.
3. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 165-6 (1927) and cases there cited; In re
Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 240, 277 Pac. 725, 730 (1929). "To deny Congress power to
acquaint itself with facts is equivalent to requiring it to prescribe remedies in darkness."
Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation (1926) 40
HARv. L. Ray. 153, 209.
4. Congress has made extensive use of the fact-finding committee. See EnaaMmo,
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1928) passim; DnIoCx, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIOATIn0
CorsnTEEs (1929) passim. See also Landis, supra note 3, at 168 et seq.
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summoned by such a committee refuses to appear, answer questions, or produce
books or documents, his contumacious conduct may be reported to the legislative
body from which the committee emanatedu and that body, if it has jurisdiction,
may imprison him for contempt.6 Though the Constitution did not expressly confer
the power to commit for contempt on either branch of Congress, the courts have
sanctioned its exercise as necessary to carry into execution the powers there granted."
However, the power is limited. Thus unless the act complained of obstructs the
performance of a legislative function,8 neither house has jurisdiction to punish for
contempt o MacCracken contended that the power was not punitive but merely
coercive in nature.") In essence his argument was this: the contempt power is
5. The legislative body and not its committee punishes for contempt. In re Davis,
58 Kan. 368, 49 Pac. 160 (1897); Ex parte Youngblood, 94 Tex. Crim. 330, 251 S. W.
509 (1923) and cases there cited. Congress has followed this practice. Contra: Sullivan v.
Hill, 73 W. Va. 49, 79 S. E. 670 (1913) (express statutory provision). Cf. Marshall v.
Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
6. The period of commitment is limited to the duration of the session. Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U. S. 204, 230 (1821) (involving the powers of the House). The Senate however
is a continuing body. 4 H.ens, PRxmMzMs or =E HousE or REPREsr,"ATIVEs (1907)
922. It would seem, therefore, that it has the power to extend its commitments beyond
the session during which they are imposed. It was chiefly to insure greater punitive powers
that a statute was passed making contempt of either house a misdemeanor, triable by the
courts and punishable by fine and imprisonment. In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 671
(1897); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 168 (1927).
7. The general American rule justifies the exercise of contempt powers as "incidental
to the legislative authority.' 1 Coo=n -, COzsmu'nozAL LrirAoN.,s (8th ed. 1927) 272.
"Incidental" as here used may mean appropriate (see note 14, infra), or by necessity
(see note 11, infra) or inherent in a legislative body. The last interpretation prevails in
the state decisions. Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395 (1866); State v. Matthew, 37 N. H.
453 (1859); Ex parte Parker, 74 S. C. 466, 55 S. E. 122 (1906). Contra: Burnham v.
Morrissey, 80 Mass. 226 (1859); People ex rel McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N .Y. 463, 2 N. E.
615 (1885). Excellent expositions of the "inherent" theory are contained in x parts
McCarthy, supra and Cusnmm, LAw AxD PRACcE or LEGrrAIVE Assmfn=S (2d ed.
1866) 220, 221, 222.
In England the houses of Parliament possess broad contempt powers by virtue of ancient
usage and prescription. Kielly v. Carson, 4 Moore P. C. C. 63, 13 Eng. Reprints 225 (1842) ;
Fenton v. Hampton, 11 Moore P. C. C. 347, 14 Eng. Reprints 727 (1858). The English
colonial legislatures, however, in the absence of an express grant, do not enjoy contempt
powers, the courts refusing to imply them from the grant of legislative authority. Doyle
v. Falconer, 4 Moore P. C. C. (N. S.) 203, 16 Eng. Reprints 293 (1866).
8. For a valuable discussion on the nature and extent of the legislative function see
Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for ContemPt (1926) 74 U. or PA. L. Rxv.
780, 789 et seq.
9. The rule is often stated in this form: unless the investigation could result in valid
legislation on the subject under inquiry, neither house has jurisdiction to punish for
contempt. In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135
(1927); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 (1929); 1 JVWrourIrDY, Co.; NST= o:A-
LAW Or TEM Urrn STATEs (2d ed. 1929) 217.
10. Thus he sought to establish the rule that the Senate's power to commit for con-
tempt could be exercised only for the purpose of removing an existing impediment to the
performance of its duties and that the power terminates as soon as the obstruction had been
removed or its removal had become impossible. The identical argument was unsuccessfully
addressed to the English House of Lords in Burdett v. Abbott, 5 Dow 165, 194, 3 Eng.
Reprints 1289, 1299 (H. L. 1817).
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implied to the extent that it is necessary to the exercise of an express power; it is
conceded that Congress necessarily has the jurisdiction to imprison for contempt, in
order to effectuate the grant of legislative power (which by implication embraces the
right to investigate) and in this manner remove obstructions to its proceedings;
yet the power is not necessary and will not, therefore, be implied, where, as in the
case of a completed contempt, the punishment will not lift the impediment.11  Prima
fade the logic is convincing. However, an analysis of the meaning attributed in the
argument to the word "necessary" reveals its fatal weakness. The word as there
employed connotes absolute necessity.1 2 Prior decisions have used it in a much
broader sense, one in accord with the interpretation given the same word in the
"elastic clause".' 3 There it has been construed to be synonymous with "appro-
priate". 14 Substitute that word for the italicized word "necessary" in MacCracken's
argument and its force is destroyed. I the court is to pass upon the appropriate-
ness of the power, the range of its considerations may go far beyond the realm of
necessity.' 5 Just what factors determined the decision in the instant case is left
to conjecture.' 0 But this does not impair the importance of the case. In straight-
forward fashion it has removed a serious threat to the independent contempt
jurisdiction of Congress. While the conclusion reached may, in some respects, be
open to criticism from a political standpoint, its soundness may not be questioned.11
11. The argument is based upon, and completely sustained by the reasoning of Marshall
v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917). There the court assumes that contempt power will be
implied only where absolutely necessary, referring to it as the "accessory power possessed
to prevent the right to assert the powers given from being obstructed and virtually
destroyed." Id. at 545. Carrying its analysis of this implied power to a logical conclusion,
the court asserted by way of dictum that punishment as such is beyond the contempt
jurisdiction of Congress. Id. at 542. It is submitted that the reasoning in reference to the
necessity of implying the power is not dicta and that the instant decision has the effect
of limiting the Gordon case to its facts. For an even narrower view, see NoaRoTN, Losmno
LIBERTy JuDicALLY (1928) 194-204.
12. See note 11, supra.
13. U. S. CoNsr. ART. I, § 8.
14. 1 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 85; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316
(1819). The federal contempt cases, in general, have employed reasoning analogous to that
expressed in McCulloch v. Maryland. Anderson v. Dunn [19 U. S. 204 (1821)] contains
strikingly similar views as to why and how powers are to be implied [ld. at 225-7];
although there are statements which might be taken as supporting the "neceslty" vlew
[id. at 230); these, however, are primarily directed at the extent of punishment allowed
and not breadth of jurisdiction. Kilbourn v. Thompson [103 U. S. 168 (1880)] specifically
omitted a consideration of the "necessity" argument. Id. at 189. In re Chapman, [166
U. S. 661 (1897)] did not discuss the point. McGrain v. Daugherty, [273 U. S. 135
(1927)] lays down the rule that " . . . the two houses of Congress in their separate
relations possess ...such auxiliary powers as are necessary and approprliate to make the
express powers effective.' (italics not in original.) Id. at 173. Compare this with
"necessary and proper" in the elastic clause (note 13, supra). Sinclair v. United States,
[279 U. S. 263 (1929)] restated and approved the rule as expressed in the Daugherty case,
15. It may, for example, weigh the increased deterrent effect of summary punishment.
Again, the fact that a practice of long standing exists, may be taken into consideration.
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 174 (1927); United States v. Midwest Onl Co., 236
U. S. 459, 473 (1915). As to what further factors may be influential in a decision, see
MAS N, BRANDEIs: LAWYER AND JUDGE iN THE MODER STATZ (1933) 1-14.
16. The court merely stated that where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct the
legislative process, MacCracken's contention was without legal significance.
17. The decision is undoubtedly repugnant to the tenets of the more conservative
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NATIONAL RECOVERY AcT-DELEGATION or LEGISLATIVE
POWERS TO PRESIDENT.-An action was brought to restrain federal officers from en-
forcing executive oil-production regulations prescribed under the authority of section
9(c) 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act.2  The plaintiff attacked the
validity of this measure on the ground that there was an unconstitutional deputation
of legislative power. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court from a
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing a holding favorable to the
plaintiff in the District Court, lield, Cardozo, J. dissenting, that the injunction
should be granted, since Congress had declared no policy and had set up no standard
for the President's action. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
It is significant to note that this is the first act of Congress which has been held
invalid on the basis of the legal maxim, delegata potestas von potest delegari.0
Whether or not the decision in the instant case endangers the continued existence
of the codes of fair competition can be answered only by a consideration of the
true meaning of the aforementioned phrase.
This theory is nowhere expressly stated in the Constitution; yet judicial interpre-
tation has implied it as a corollary from the doctrine of the separation of powers,4
as expounded by MontesquieuG and used as a structural basis for the first three
articles of the Federal Constitution.6 During the infancy of the government, a rigid
adherence to this theory might have been countenanced. However, as society
became more complex and vast changes were wrought in the nation's economic and
political life, it became manifestly impossible for Congress to pass upon all the
minute details of legislation. Gradually the national legislature began to grant part
authorities. See NORTON, op. cit. supra note 11. The abridgment of rights in general has
received criticism. Thus Beck maintains that "What this generation of Americans has
witnessed has been the destruction of the basic ideals of American liberty, of which the
Constitution was but one expression." Beck, Future of the Constitution (1933) 19 A. B.
A. J. 493, 495. Contrast this with the liberal statement of Justice Brandeis (the writer
of the opinion in the instant case): "In order to preserve the liberty and the property of the
majority of the citizens of a state, rights of property and the liberty of the individual
must be remoulded from time to time to meet the changing needs of society." Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 376 (1921).
1. "The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from Etorage in
excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any
State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, comvmie.on,
officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the
President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to
exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both."
2. 48 STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1933) et seq.
3. Fundamentally, this is a doctrine of agency. 2 K-'s Commar. *633. For the history
and application of it to constitutional law, see Duff & Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non
Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law (1929) 14 CoRNY. L. Q. 168.
4. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U. S. 1 (1825); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 163
(18S0).
5. Mo N=sQUmU, L'EsPrr DES LoIs, bk. 9, c. 4.
6. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress ... "; Art. II, § 1 (1): "The executive Power shall be vested in a President ... ";
Art. I, § 1: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."
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of its power to the Executive and to administrative boards. 7 Before long, the
Supreme Court was faced with the problem of the validity of such delegation. The
Court was quick to realize that the maxim was not "a doctrinaire concept to be
made use of with pedantic rigor." s
In the first case relating to delegation of legislative power, the rule was adopted
and later reiterated that the President could determine the contingencies upon which
a legislative enactment should become operative.9 Subsequently, it was ruled that,
after Congress has formulated a basic policy, the "power to fill up the details" may
be entrusted to administrative officials. 10 Violations of their rules may be punishable
as criminal offenses.' 1 The Secretary of the Treasury has been allowed to establish
the standards to govern in the importation of tea. 12 To determine whether a par-
ticular bridge is an unreasonable obstruction to navigation is within the purview of
the Secretary of War.' 3 Thus the courts have recognized that legislative specificity
is not adapted to an intricate social system. General rules covering large classes of
facts are proper promulgations of Congress, while the application of its policies to
concrete situations is wisely granted to administrative agencies.
14
Though the courts have been slow to admit that there has been a delegation of
power in many instances, 15 recent cases have evidenced a shift from the inquiry
as to whether there has been a delegation to the actual necessity for it.1O Thus it has
7. Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. RV. 614.
"Hardly a measure passes Congress the effective execution of which is not conditioned
upon rules and regulations emanating from the enforcing authorities."
8. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 55 Sup. Ct. 241, 257, 293 U. S. 388,440 (1935).
9. The Aurora v. United States, 11 U. S. 382 (1813) (revival of Embargo Act was
made dependent on Presidential proclamation); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892)
(power granted to Executive to suspend free introduction of sugar, molasses, etc., If countries
benefited by this schedule taxed American products).
10. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911) (Secretary of Agriculture was
authorized to pass rules and regulations for the preservation of national forests.)
11. However, the penalty must be determined by the legislature. If the administrative
official is granted the power to declare violations of his rules a crime, then there Is an
invalid delegation. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911) semblc; People v.
Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275, N. Y. Supp. 74 (3d Dep't 1934).
12. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
13. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1907); Monongahela Bridge Co.
v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1910).
14. Administrative agencies are best able to cope with the myriad technical problems
of the day since they are composed of experts. Black, Book Review (1934) 68 U. S. L.
Ray. 587.
15. For a collection of "strange nuances of terminology" caused by the reluctance of the
courts to admit that there has been permissible delegation, see Comment (1933) 31
MicH. L. Rv. 786, 787.
16. In upholding the power of the President to change rates under flexible tariff
provisions, Chief Justice Taft said, "In determining what it [Congress] may do in seeking
assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed
according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination."
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). For other cases upholding the
delegation of authority involving the exercise of powers of a legislative character, geo
Inter-Mountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914) (Interstate Commerce Commission
empowered to fix railroad rates); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924) (Secretary of
Labor given power to deport undesirable aliens); Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127
(1924).
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been held that Congress may seek assistance from another branch whenever it has
gone as far as it reasonably can in declaring a policy.17
In the light of these principles and the criticism of the entire doctrine of separation
of powers by many learned writers,' 8 it is submitted that the executive orders herein
might have been sustained. "Discretion is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing."'19 Section 1 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act20 declares the policy behind section 9(c), namely, inter alia, "to
eliminate unfair competitive practices" and "to conserve natural resources." Since
only oil shipped in interstate commerce in excess of state quotas may be prohibited,
a definite standard is established. An apparent weakness lies in the stipulation that
the President is authorized to act, but not directed to do so. But authorization under
the circumstances amounted to a direction to act whenever the need arose.21
The validity of the codes is strengthened rather than weakened by this decision
since section 3(a)22 is buttressed against the two points of vulnerability in section
9(c). One source of objection was that even if the act in question were constitu-
tional, the executive orders would nevertheless be vitiated because the President
had not published his findings. It is questionable whether this is a necessary
condition precedent to the legality of the orders.P At most it is a formal tech-
nicality for which provision is made under the codes. The major point of deavage
between the majority and the minority was the contention of the prevailing opinion
that no policy or standard could be read into section 9(c) from section 1. No such
difficulty, however, is encountered in section 3(a) for the reason that the codes
must conform to a standard of fair competition and the declaration of policy behind
the entire Act is incorporated therein by reference. Having determined an in-
telligible principle to guide the President, Congress rightfully delegated the actual
establishment of the codes to him. Through the highly specialized knowledge at the
command of administrative agencies, the unforeseeable fluctuations in the nation's
present unsettled economic life can be handled in the most efficient and scientific
manner.
17. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928), cited note 16, suPra.
13. Mlany writers deny the desirability of the doctrine of the separation of powers and
dispute its value and reality. GooDzow, Co ar.aAn, AD 2 T Ia' ir, (1903) 20;
LAsr, Aurnoa=rr = mm MODE=u STr (1919) 70, 71. It is not essential to liberty,
but it is only the principle of division of labor applied to government. Pound, Spuwious
Inrpretation (1907) 7 COL. L. REv. 379, 384.
19. Dissenting opinion of Cardozo, J. in the instant case. 55 Sup. Ct. 241, 256, 293
U. S. 3SS,440 (1935).
20. 4s STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1933).
21. The necessity for the executive orders has been verified by an adoption at the oil
states' conference of a resolution calling for speedy passage of a new bill to bar shipment
of "hot oil" in interstate commerce. N. Y. Times, Feb 17, 1935 § 2 at 9.
22. "Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or industrial as-ocia-
tions or groups, the President may approve a code or codes of fair competition for the
trade or industry or subdivision thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if
the President finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no inequitable restrictions
on admission to membership therein and are truly representative of such trades or
industries or subdivisions thereof, and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to
promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to
discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy of this title . . .
"
23. In Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, 26-0
U. S. 48 (1922), and aiahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924), the cases cited by the majority
in support of this proposition, the statutes in question specifically required a statement
of findings. Where no such statement is made necessary, the better rule appears to be
that the President should be presumed to act in pursuance of his authority.
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DAMAGES-INADEQUACY-INCREASING JuRY'S VERDICT WITi CONSENT OF DE-
FENDANT IN LIEU OF NEW TnRAL.-The plaintiff moved for a new trial because of
the inadequacy of damages awarded in a negligence action. The trial judge offered to
grant the motion unless the defendant consented to pay $1500, which was $1000 in
excess of the jury's award. The defendant consented and plaintiff's motion for a
new trial was denied. On appeal, the federal circuit court1 held that the trial judge's
action was unauthorized and reversed the judgment. One judge dissented. On
further appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, that the increasing
of damages was beyond the power of the trial justice. Judgment affirmed. Four
justices dissented. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474 (1935).
Closely linked to the question of additur-the enlargement of the recovery allowed
by a jury, conditioned only upon the acquiesence of the defendant and preclusive
of the plaintiff's right to a new trial-is the problem of the propriety of the partial
remission of damages solely by the act of the trial justice. The majority of the
courts in this country permit the presiding judge to exercise this latter power of
remittitur in a proper case,2 and although there are still some jurisdictions wherein
it is disallowed and condemned as unconstitutional,3 most jurisdictions have upheld
its constitutionality.4 However, where the damages are inadequate instead of
excessive, the scope of judicial interference has been more limited. In such cases
many courts including even some that grant remittitur will decree a new trial6 in
lieu of exercising the power of additur. Their action is based on two grounds,
neither of which is plausible or tenable. They contend, first, that additur was
unheard of at common law, and that this is negative evidence tending to show a
lack of judicial belief in the existence of the power; secondly, that the use of additur
would violate the right to trial by jury,6 guarantied by the Seventh Amendment,7
In considering the first objection it may be perceived that additur was recognized
and applied in mayhem cases at common law;8 that it was ordered in an early English
1. Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 1st. 1934).
2. Northern Pacific R. R. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642 (1886); Gila Valley Ry. v. Hall,
232 U. S. 94 (1914); Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 (1867); Hayden v. Florence Sewing
Machine Co., 54 N. Y. 221 (1873); Silverglade v. Von Rohr, 107 Ohio St. 75, 140 N. E.
669 (1923); 2 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) § 459 (remittitur proper); Comment
(1933) 18 IowA L. REv. 404.
3. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Earl's Adm'x, 94 Ky. 368, 22 S. W. 607 (1893). Cl.
Watt v. Watt, (1905) A. C. 115 (overruling Belt v. Lawes, 12 Q. B. D. 356 [1884);
Fleming v. Bank of New Zealand, [1900] A. C. 577).
4. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69 (1889); Alabama Power
Co. v. Talmadge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 So. 548 (1921); Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 123
Mo. 221, 27 S. W. 453 (1894); Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N. M. 541, 191 Pac. 442 (1919);
also see cases supra, note 2.
5. Clark v. Iowa Cent. R. R. Co., 162 Iowa 630, 144 N. W. 332 (1913); City of Grand
Rapids v. Coit, 149 Mich. 668, 113 N. W. 362 (1907); Lee v. Publishers George Knapp &
Co., 137 Mo. 385, 38 S. W. 1107 (1897); Doody v. Boston &j M. R. R., 77 N. H. 161,
89 AtI. 487 (1914); McDonald v. Walker, 40 N. Y. 551 (1869); Reuter v. Hickman, Laugon
& Diener Co., 160 Wis. 284, 151 N. W. 795 (1915); see (1929) 15 Va. L. Rev. 592.
6. The following cases hold that additur is unconstitutional because it deprives the
plaintiff of his trial by jury: Shanahan v. Boston and N. St. Ry., 193 Mas. 412, 79 N. E.
751 (1907); Werner v. Bryden, 84 Cal. App. 472, 258 Pac. 138 (1927); City of Grand
Rapids v. Colt, 149 Mich. 668, 113 N. W. 362 (1907) ; Goldsmith v. Detroit, J. & C. Ry. Co.,
165 Mich. 177, 130 N. W. 647 (1911).
7. U. S. CoNsT. 7th Amendment.
8. Burton v. Baynes, Barne's Practice Cases, 153, 94 Eng. Reprints 852 (K. B. 1733)
[Vol. 4
RECENT DECISIONS
case;9 that dicta relating thereto are found in more recent cases;10 and references by
ancient text writers1 ' indicate that the practice was not unknown at English common
law, which is the "Common Law" of the Seventh Amendment. But assuming that
additur was unknown at the common law, this is not a conclusive argument against
its existence today. It must be remembered that the common law is not immutable but
flexible.12 Today an interested party is a competent witness in his own behalf; a
wife may testify in behalf of her husband,' 3 yet these practices were adopted
in the face of volumes of precedents to the contrary. Today also, a federal
court, without the consent of the parties, may constitutionally (1) appoint audi-
tors to hear testimony, examine books and accounts; 14 (2) require both a gen-
eral and a special verdict and set aside the general verdict for the plaintiff and
direct a verdict for the defendant on the basis, of the facts specially found;'3
(3) accept so much of the verdict as determines the right to recover and order a
new trial on the issue of damages alone.' 0 Yet none of these three groups of
procedures was known to the common law.17 To concede this capacity for growth
and change in the common law and at the same time to say that the courts vill not
adopt a rule which is wise, just and expedient, is a contradiction in terms.
In dealing with additur and the violation of the Seventh Amendment, it must be
remembered that such a provision of a great instrument of government is concerned
with substance and not with form. The purpose of the amendment is to preserve
the essentials of the jury trial, and for this reason the federal courts have often
refused to construe it as intended to perpetuate in changeless form the minutiae of
trial practice as it existed in the English courts in 1791.
Thus interpreted, the Seventh Amendment guarantees that litigants in actions at
law shall have the benefits of a trial of issues of fact by a jury. In regard to the
court's control of the jury's verdict, and the power of the trial judge to determine
the issues for the jury and those for the judge, it does not limit the court to the
particular forms of trial practice in use in 1791.18 No bar has been found by the
courts in the Seventh Amendment to the adoption of novel methods10 of dealing
with the verdict of a jury, for they left unimpaired the function of the jury to
decide issues of facL2 0 Therefore it is evident that in additur the jury's function
has not been unconstitutionally infringed upon. The authority to determine
whether damages are excessive implies authority to determine when they are in-
(court increased the damages from £11, 14s. to £50); Brown v. Seymour, 1 Wils. 5, 95
Eng. Reprints 461 (K. B. 1742); 2 BAcons ABanMoMruTT (7th ed. 1832) 611; S.wmn, IAcw
or DAaGES (1770) 173 et seq.
9. Armytage v. Haley, 4 Q. B. 917, 114 Eng. Reprints 1143 (1843).
10. See Larkins v. Ohio Electric Ry., 4 Ohio App.. 37, 44 (1914); Belt v. Lawes, 12
Q. B. D. 356 (1884).
11. See sup'a, note 8.
12. Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933).
13. Ibid, overruling Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79 (1911) and Jin Lucy Moy
v. United States 254 U. S. 189 (1920).
14. E Parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300 (1920).
15. Walker v. New Mlexico & Southern Pac. R. R. 165 U. S. 593 (1897).
16. Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494 (1931).
17. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 491 (1935).
18. Walker v. New Mlexico & Southern Pac. R. R. 169 U. S. 593 (1897); Ex Part c
Peterson, 253 U. S. 300 (1920); Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co. 283
U. S. 494 (1931).
19. Supra, note 18.
20. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace 288 U. S. 249, 264 (1933).
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adequate; for the right to give the plaintiff an option in the former case as a matter
of justice and equality should, by a parity of reasoning, give the defendant a
similar option when the damages are insufficient. All that is said with regard to
remittitur is equally applicable to additur. For in neither case does the jury return
a verdict for the amount actually recovered, and in both the amount of recovery
was fixed, not by the verdict, but by the consent of the party resisting the motion
for a new trial.
In view of the hue and cry for the expeditious administration of justice and the
steps taken in that direction by state legislatures, 21 it would seem a most appro-
priate time to adopt the rule of additur with its inherent benefits. The exercise
of this discretionary power by the courts would evolve a most valuable means of
promptly terminating litigation, without the expense and delays consequent upon a
successful motion for a new trial, thus alleviating the burden on the court calendars,
which would be a long step forward towards the achievement of the ultimate end
of the true administration of justice.
Legal inertia, superficiality and sheer nonsense are contributing to the hindrance
of justice. The states can help to amend this situation by continuing to adopt- 2
additur and thus make progressive strides toward the attainment of the supreme
goal-the true, expedient, and substantial administration of justice.
EVIDENCE-Res Gestae-ADmisSrILITY OF SELF-SERVING DECLARATION AS PART
TnnaaoP.-An action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained in a
railway crossing accident. The plaintiff was permitted to testify, over the objection
and exception of the defendant, that upon regaining consciousness he said "for
God's sake, men, ain't you got no consideration at all for an open crossing, coming
down like going to a fire, ... you haven't any lights, you didn't ring a bell or blow
a whistle, you don't give a man warning of any kind that you were around here."
The defendant appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Held, that the declaration being self-
serving, was inadmissible although part of the res gestae. Order reversed and new
trial granted. Fischer v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 258 N. W. 4 (Minn. 1934).
The doctrine of res gestae,l although firmly woven into the fabric of the law of
21. N. Y. Ju -RcvYa LAW (1934) §§ 40-48; N. Y. L.oIsLATr= LAW (1934) §§ 70-72;
Legis. (1935) 4 FoRDami L.A REv. 102.
22. The undeniable trend toward additur is evidenced by the following cases: Adamson
v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 125, 198 Pac. 52 (1921); E. Trig Napler Co. v.
Gloss, 150 Ga. 561, 104 S. E. 230 (1920); Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866); James v.
Morey, 44 11. 352 (1867) ; Smith v. Ellyson, 137 Iowa 391, 115 N. W. 40 (1908) ; Clark v.
Henshaw Motor Co., 246 Mass. 386, 140 N. E. 593 (1923); Marsh v. Minneapolis Brewing
Co., 92 Minn. 182, 99 N. W. 630 (1904); Ford v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 98 Minn. 96, 107
N. W. 817 (1906); Gaffney v. Illingsworth, 90 N. J. L. 490, 101 At. 243 (1917) (additur
allowed by statute); Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573 (1924) (additur
allowed by statute); Gosczinski v. Carlson, 157 Wis. 551, 147 N. W. 1018 (1914); Camp-
bell v. Stuliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374 (1927); Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 270, 248
N. W. 127 (1933); Morrell v. Gabeil, 84 N. H. 150, 147 Atl. 413 (1921) semble; Comment
(1934) 44 YAL L. J. 318; see Battalora v. Carnahan Creamery, 157 So. 612, 615 (La. 1934);
Larkins v. Ohio Electric Ry., 4 Ohio App. 37, 44 (1914).
1. The authorities sanction the admissibility of three classes of declarations under the
doctrine of res gestae: (a) declarations directly in issue under the pleadings, Lawrence v.
Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859) (verbal contract); (b) verbal acts-declarations accompanying
and elucidating equivocal acts, The John E. Berwind, S6 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932);
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evidence, has frequently proven troublesome. Opinions considering the admissibility
in evidence of an act or declaration as "part of the res gestac" are generally char-
acterized by a lack of precision, engendered by, and attributable to: (1) the compre-
hensiveness of the phrase; 2 (2) its loose, unnecessary, and at times indiscriminate
application by the courts; 3 (3) its use as a convenient instrument to be adopted or
rejected to suit the purposes of the courts.4 The resultant confusion has given
considerable weight to the suggestion that the use of the term be discontinued.G
However, although there is not complete unanimity, the authorities generally agree
that an act or declaration made in the course of a transaction under investigation
by the court,3 is admissible in evidence when it relates toT and throws light on that
transaction.3 In point of time, the act or declaration need not coincide precisely
with the transaction under investigation;9 and where the declarant has been rendered
unconscious, his declaration made immediately upon reviving is admissible regardless
of time.'0
Hargreaves v. Keogh Storage Co, 250 Mass. 339, 145 N. E. 456 (1924); Peattie v.
Gabel, 155 App. Div. 7S6, 140 N. Y. Supp. 993 (4th Dep't 1913); (c) spontaneous
utterances--declarations impulsively made while under the influence of an exciting event,
People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1903). It should be noted that of
the three classes the last alone presents an exception to the hearsay rule. For an ex-
cellent discussion of the doctrine see 3 Wsmaopx, EvrnnNcE (2d ed. 1923) § 1745 et seq.;
Bohlen, The Admissibility of Declarations as Part of the Res Getae (1903) 51 U. or P,.
L. Rnv. 187.
2. See note 1, supra; also note 3, infra.
3. Repeatedly the courts have unnecessarily applied the doctrine to acts or declarations
evidencing mental states. 3 WIoGoRE, EvmEcNC (2d ed. 1923) § 1715 (2). For an im-
proper application of the doctrine to the admissions of an agent see Stecher Lithographic
Co. v. Inman, 175 N. Y. 124, 67 N. E. 213 (1903). Wigmore deprecates its application
to the admissions of an agent and the declarations of a co-conspirator. 3 Womsonz,
EvimxcE (2d ed. 1923) § 1769.
4. For example, in People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1903), the
witness, immediately after the assault, ran to side of deceased asking what was the matter.
The answer, "9Del Vermo stabbed me," was admitted as part of the res gestae. In Greener
v. General Electric Co., 209 N. Y. 135, 102 N. E. 527 (1913), the witness, immediately
after the accident, ran to the deceased asking what had happened. Yet the court, while
approving the Del Vermo case, held the answer inadmisile on the ground that it was
mere narrative.
5. Morgan, A Suggested Classific4tion of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestac (1922)
31 YArx L. J. 229.
6. See Tilson v. Terwilliger, 56 N. Y. 273, 277 (1874); Waldele v. N. Y. C. & H. R.
R. R, 95 N. Y. 274, 280 (1884). But see 3 WOmsonr, EvinracE (2d ed. 1923) § 1753.
7. Deator v. Penn Mach. Co., 311 Pa. 291, 166 AtL 846 (1933). But see 3 VxauoMo
EviDNcE (2d ed. 1923) § 1750 (c).
8. Robinson v. Doe, 224 Mass. 319, 112 N. E. 1007 (1916); Holyoke v. Holyoke's
Estate, 110 Me. 469, 87 Ad. 40 (1913). In Waldele v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 95 N. Y.
274, 278 (1884), Earl, J., writes, "The res gestae, speaking generally, was the accident.
These declarations were no part of that-were not made at the same time, or so nearly
contemporaneous with it as to characterize it, or throw any light upon it."
9. Traveller's Ins. Co. v. Mosely, 75 U. S. 397 (1869); Scheir v. Quirin, 77 App. Div.
624, 78 N. Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dep't 1902), aft'd, 177 N. Y. 568, 69 N. E. 1130 (1904);
(1916) 64 U.'or PA. L. REv. 851; (1918) 31 HARv. L. Rv. 801; (1922) 70 U. or P. L.
REv. 332. See cases collected in Note (1913) 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 917.
10. Britton v. Washington Water Power Co., 59 Wash. 440, 110 Pac. 20 (1910) (de-
clarant was unconscious for eight days); cf. Eby v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 281 Pa. 96, 126
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In the case of declarations occasioned by an unusual or exciting event, the test
is spontaneity; 1 the rationale apparently being-time for reflection presents op-
portunity for fabrication.12 If it satisfies this test, the declaration may be that of
the actor 13 or, in most jurisdictions, that of a mere bystander.14 It is submitted that
the admissibility of the declaration does not depend upon its being unfavorable to
the declarant. Thus, while declarations have been admitted when they were against
the interest of the declarant,' 5 the instances in which they have been admitted when
favorable to the declarant are equally numerous;" o and although self-serving, they
have been admitted as part of the res gestae.IT Further, that the declarant himself is
offering the testimony does not magnify its self-serving character, and this fact does
not justify the exclusion of the evidence.' 8  In the principal case the appellate
court was troubled by the fact that the plaintiff was under a great temptation to
AtI. 209 (1917) (declaration of deceased who had swallowed the bristles of a tooth brush,
uttered as soon as he was able to talk, about 15 minutes after swallowing them, was
admitted).
11. People v. Del. Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908); State v. Lasechl, 90
Ohio St. 10, 106 N. E. 660 (1914); 3 ,VIamo E, EvmENcn (2d ed. 1923) § 1749; (1915)
63 U. or PA. L. Rav. 342; (1915) 64 U. oF PA. L. REv. 99; (1922) 70 U. oF PA. L. REV. 332.
12. Cases cited in note 11, supra; 3 Wioxoan, EvWDxcE (2d ed. 1923) § 1750 (2).
13. Scheir v. Quirin, 77 App. Div. 624, 78 N. Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dep't 1902), al'd, 177
N. Y. 568, 69 N. E. 1130 (1904); Deator v. Penn. Mach. Co., 311 Pa. 291, 166 Atl.
846 (1933).
14. Hedlund v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 120 Minn. 319, 139 N. W. 603 (1913); Cromeenes
v. San Pedro, L. A. & St. L. R. R., 37 Utah 475, 109 Pac. 10 (1910); (1915) 63 U. or PA.
L. REv. 342. But New York seems to have adopted a contrary rule. Andrews, C. J., in
Butler v. Manhattan Ry., 143 N. Y. 417, 423, 38 N. E. 454, 456, (1894), writes, "but, If
declarations of third persons are not in their nature a part of the fact, they are not
admissible in evidence, however closely related in point of time." While in People v.
Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 483, 85 N. E. 690, 695 (1908), Bartlett, J., states the rule In
this manner: "Evidence is admissible of exclamatory statements declaratory of the cir-
cumstances of an injury when uttered by the injured person immediately after the Injury".
(Italics not in original.) However, in People v. DeSimone, 225 N. Y. 261, 121 N. B.
761 (1919), the spontaneous utterance of a bystander was admitted, not as part of the
res gestae, but as a part of the relevant explanation and description of the acts of the
witness. Comment (1919) 4 CoRN. L. Q. 208.
15. Perry v. Haritos, 100 Conn. 476, 124 AtI. 44 (1924); Springfield Consol. R. R.
v. Welsch, 155 Ill. 511, 40 N. E. 1034 (1895); Ensley v. Detroit Ry., 134 Mich. 195, 96
N. W. 34 (1903).
16. Denver City Tramway Co. v. Brumley, 51 Colo. 251, 116 Pac. 1051 (1911);
Lambrecht v. Schreyer, 129 Minn. 271, 152 N. W. 645 (1915). In the latter case the court
said, "If the statement is made under circumstances bringing it within the rule of res
gestae, it is competent whether favorable or unfavorable to the person making It, since It
is received not as an admission, but as testimonial evidence." 152 N. W. 646.
17. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Goss, 214 Ala. 102, 106 So. 607 (1925); Rogers v,
Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 138 Cal. 285, 71 Pac. 348 (1903); Mineola Mill Co. v. Griffin, 18
Ga. App. 668, 90 So. 360 (1916). In Everman's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. R., 219 Ky.
478, 293 S. W. 977, 978 (1927), Thomas, J., says, "It is quite clear that the statement, If
made with mature deliberation was self-serving, and not admissible, unless it was part of the
res gestae." (Italics not in original).
18. Mineola Mill Co. v. Griffin, 18 Ga. App. 668, 90 S. E. 360 (1916); cf. Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Goss, 214 Ala. 102, 106 So. 607 (1925). (Plaintiff was allowed to introduce
in evidence a self-serving letter written by himself, but which was part of the res gestac.)
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manufacture evidence for himself. 19 But the trial court, it would seem, was in a
far better position to decide this question2o and its decision should be conclusive
if supported by the facts and circumstances bearing upon the declaration.-"
LIBEL AND SLANDEr-LIABILITY N TESTAIENTARY DEFAMT0x.-The plaintiff
sued the testator's estate to recover damages for a libel contained in the decedents
wil, referring to the plaintiff as illegitimate and stating that she was not entitled to
share in the testator's estate. Prior to his death, the testator had contested four
claims made against him, in the course of twenty-seven years, for the support of
the plaintiff. These claims resulted in settlements out of court of substantial sums
of money, but the testator always reserved the question of paternity, and he vas
consistent throughout in his attitude concerning the plaintiff's legitimacy. The trial
court set aside a verdict of $150,000 for the plaintiff and entered judgment for
the defendant. On appeal, held, that the matter contained in a will offered for
probate is privileged. Judgment affirmed. Nagle v. Nagle, 175 AtL 487 (Pa. 1934).
The common law doctrine that personal actions die with the person' is no longer
regarded with favor by the courts- and has been steadily modified by legislation
but in general the torts of libel and slander have been excepted from the operation
of these modifying statutes.4 The precise problem of liability for a testamentary
defamation has never been adjudicated in England, and it has rarely arisen in this
19. The case of Greener v. General Electric Co., 209 N. Y. 135, 102 N. E. 527 (1913),
s=pra note 4, has been justified on this ground.
20. United States v. O'Brien, 51 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Perry v. Harito3,
100 Conn. 476, 124 AML 44 (1924); Cincinnati H. & D. R. Co. v. Gross, 186 Ind. 471, 114
N. E. 962 (1917); Pride v. Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, 207 Iowa 167, 216 N. W.
62 (1927); Roach v. Great Northern Ry. 133 Minn. 257, 158 N. W. 232 (1916); St. Laurent
v. Manchester St. Ry., 77 N. H. 460, 92 AtL 959 (1915); State v. McDaniel, 63 S. C. 304,
47 S. E. 384 (1904). Contra: Equitable IMut. Acc. Ass'n v. McCluskey, 1 Colo. App. 473,
29 Pac. 383 (1892).
21. See cases cited in note 20 supra. Wheeler, C. J. writing in Perry v. Haritos, 100
Conn. 476, 485, 124 Atl. 44, 47 (1924), states, "Before admitting such utterance, the trial
judge must decide the preliminary question, and determine that the declarant has had no
opportunity for deliberation and reflection and that the utterance was a spontaneous one.
His decision upon such a preliminary question will be left to his discretion unre%ieable
by us, unless his conclusion be found to have been an unreasonable exercise of discretion?'
1. Henshaw v. Miler, 58 U. S. 212 (1854); Miller v. Nuckolls, 76 Ark. 485, 89 S. W.
88 (1905); More v. Bennett, 65 Barb. 338 (N. Y. 1873); Ireland v. Champncys, 4 Taunt.
884, 128 Eng. Reprints 580 (1813) (action for libel abated when the plaintiff died before
the judgment was entered but after the verdict was rendered). If the immediate result of
the wrong is the enrichment of the estate of the tort-feasor, a recovery may be had.
Hambly v. Trott, 1 Cowp. 371, 98 Eng. Reprints 1136 (1776).
2. "It [the doctrine] has no champion at this date, nor has any judge or law vriter
risen to defend it for 200 years past." Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 581,
162 S. W. 584, 586 (1914).
3. See Comment (1935) 4 FOpDHAZI L. Rlv. 90, n. 6.
4. E.g., Al.. Conn Aim. (Michie, 1928) §§ 5712, 5713; ARn. Dic. STAT. (Crawford &
Moses, 1921) § 1070; hLn. Rv. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) c. 3, § 125; MID. A,.:. CoDo (Bagby,
Supp. 1929) art. 93, § 106; N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAwe (1909) § 120, as amended by Lav's of 1932,
c. 458; N. C. CoDE Aim. (M1lichie, Supp. 1933) § 162; OxA. STAT. A,-;. (Harlow, 1931)
§§ 568, 569; PA. STAT. Amn. (Purdon, 1930) vol. 20, § 772; Wis. STAT. (1933) c. 287, § 1.
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country.8 Where the probate of the will is relied upon as the publication o of the
libel, the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona is not applicable inasmuch
as no cause of action existed prior to the death of the testator.7 What is probably
the first case of testamentary libel to reach the courts, held that since a libel
contained in a will was a deliberate attempt to inflict a lasting injury by means of
a public record, public policy required that the person wronged should have a
remedy.8 A later case predicated liability against the estate on the theory that the
executor was the testator's agent for the publication of the libel.0 But assuming that
an agency was created, it must have been created either before or after the death of
the testator. If before, it was revoked by his death;'o if after, the agency must fail
for lack of a principal. In Citizens' & Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks,11 it was
decided that an action for libel could not be maintained for a defamation contained
in a will offered for probate. The court reasoned that if the testator die before the
publication of the libel,12 the maxim actie personalis moritur curn persona will bar a
recovery;13 that the executor's act in propounding the will cannot be relied upon to
complete the libel, because the testator has died; and that the executor's act in
probating the will cannot be taken into account since the executor is an agency of
the law and not the' testator's representative in the continuation of the wrong.
The principal case disposed of the problem on the novel ground that a will is closely
analogous to a complaint in a civil action in that it is the commencement of a
judicial proceeding, and if the defamation is relevant or pertinent, the publication
is absolutely privileged.14  The decisions allowing a recovery cannot be defended on
established legal principles, however desirable their result may be on the ground of
5. There seem to be but three cases on the subject: Gallagher's Estate, 10 D. & C.
733 (Pa. 1900); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1914);
Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313 (1933).
6. In a civil action for libel, publication is an essential element. Roberts v. English
Mfg. Co., 155 Ala. 414, 46 So. 752 (1908); Dobbins v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
157 Mo. App. 689, 138 S. W. 682 (1911). A defamatory writing is published as soon as
it is read by a person other than the person defamed. Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36,
175 N. E. 505 (1931).
7. Gallagher's Estate, 10 D. & C. 733 (Pa. 1900); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128
Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584, 49 L. R. A. (r. s.) 897, Ann. Cas. 1914C 885 (1914); cf.
Citizens' & Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313, 87 A. L. R.
234 (1933).
8. Gallagher's Estate, 10 D. & C. 733 (Pa. 1900).
9. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1914). See Comment
(1914) 23 YALE L. J. 534.
10. Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 21 U. S. 173 (1823); Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y.
600, 21 N. E. 985 (1889). If the testator attempted to create an agency to take effect
after his death, death terminated the authority which purported to create the agency.
Moore v. Weston, 13 N. D. 574, 102 N. W. 163 (1904).
11. 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313, 87 A. L. R. 234 (1933).
12. In all the adjudicated cases involving a posthumous defamation, the publication
relied upon was the offering of the will to probate. Obviously, if publication by the
testator during his lifetime is relied upon the maxim actio personalis moritur curn Pcrsona
will bar a recovery. See Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 580, 162 S. W.
584, 586 (1914).
13. The court was in error at this point. If there was no publication during the
testator's lifetime there was no cause of action that could die with the person. Frelfleld,
Libel by Will (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 301; Gallagher's Estate; Harris v. Nashville Trust
Co., both supra note 7.
14. Defamatory statements made in a pleading must be relevant and pertinent to the
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public policy. Inasmuch as the libel is not perfected until application for probate
is made, the courts that have allowed a recovery have decided, in effect, that the
testator, while in his grave, has committed an actionable wrong. From the practical
point of view, permitting a recovery in such actions may open the door to fraud
and perjury.' 6 This is particularly true, when the only person who could establish
the truth of the defamatory words is the decedent. Nevertheless, it must be
recognized that a posthumous defamation is sni gencris, and the remedy likewise
must be sui generis. The inability to fit the wrong to an existing remedy should
not prove fatal; a remedy should be created to fit the wrong.17 Justice and public
policy demand that technicalities be overlooked for the protection of the right of
reputation from the acts of one who intentionally perpetuates a libel by means of a
public record. In the principal case, though recovery was denied the plaintiff, the
court intimates that a recovery may be had where the libel contained in the will
is neither relevant nor pertinent to the disposition of the estate. 18
It has been suggested that the most satisfactory way of coping with the situation
is to exclude the libelous matter from probate.19 The right of the courts to expunge
a libel from a will is doubtful.20  While the act of removing the libelous matter
will not constitute a complete defense to a libel action, it will constitute a partial
defense in mitigation of damages. Furthermore, it will have the salutary effect of
deleting the objectionable matter from public record. It is submitted that if the
libel is non-dispositive, a court of equity ought in good conscience to strike out the
subject of inquiry in order to be absolutely privileged. Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85, 67 Ad.
991 (1907); Miller v. Gust, 71 Wash. 139, 127 Pac. 845 (1912). Relevancy and
pertinency are liberally construed in favor of the pleader. Bussewitz v. Wisconsin Teach-
ers' Ass'n, 188 Wis. 121, 205 N. W. 803 (1925).
15. Comments (1902) 15 HARv. L. Rnv. 483; (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 666; (1914) 12
Mrcm. L. REv. 4S9; (1914) 23 YAr.n L. 3. 534.
16. A bill was recently introduced in the New York State Legislature (A., Pr. 426,
Int. 418) providing for the survival of all personal injury actions including libel and
slander. The Committee on State Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York disapproved this bill on the ground that "To allow such actions [libel,
slander, etc.] to survive death would open the door to great abuses and fraud." (1935)
Ass'n of Bar of City of N. Y. Bull. No. 5, 243, 245.
17. The lack of a precedent is strong evidence against the existence of the right.
Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902). But it is
not an absolute bar to recovery. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.. Co., 122 Ga. 190,
50 S. E. 68 (1905); Rice v. Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393 (1876); Bennett v. Bennett, 116
N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889); Kujeck v. Goldman, 150 N. Y. 176, 44 N. E. 773 (1896).
18. 175 Atl. 487, 488.
19. Comments (1902) 15 HARv. L. Rnv. 433; (1914) 23 YALE L. J. 534.
20. The authorities on this point are divided: Estate of White [1914] P. 153 (scandalous
words omitted from probate but not from the will); Wartnaby's Goods, 1 Rob. Eccl. 423,
163 Eng. Reprints 1083 (1846) (passages omitted from probate copy); Mar-h v. Marsh,
1 Swa. & Tr. 523, 164 Eng. Reprints 845 (1860) (libel stricken from will on consent);
Matter of Bomar, 27 Abb. N. C. 425, 18 N. Y. Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct. 1892) (non-dispositive
libel stricken from will); Matter of Spelden, 128 Misc. 899, 221 N. Y. Supp. 223 (Surr.
Ct. 1926) (non-dispositive libel stricken out). Contra: Matter of Meyer, 72 Mic. 566,
131 N. Y. Supp. 27, (Surr. Ct. 1911) (refused to strike scandalous matter from will);
Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Addams 33, 162 Eng. Reprints 393 (1825) (refused to delete libelous




matter from the will;21 and in those cases where it is possible to. do so without
destroying the gift, the same remedy should be applied to a dispositive libel.-
2
TAxATioN-INTANGIBLEs-SITuS.-A Delaware corporation was duly authorized to
conduct business in the states of Minnesota, Ohio and West Virginia, managerial
control of its operations radiating principally from the last named state. Several of
its manufacturing plants were located therein and sales agencies were distributed
throughout the United States. All orders were subject to acceptance by the West
Virginia office and invoices were sent from and payable at that place, although bills
of lading and shipping notices were sent directly from outside plants. There were
bank deposits in five states subject to withdrawal by the various plants, together
with outstanding accounts receivable. In this proceeding the circuit court reduced
an assessment, made pursuant to statute, to that portion of the accounts receivable,
and deposits in banks within the state, as arose from the sale of goods manufactured
within the state. On appeal, held, that the entire intangible property of the cor-
poration had acquired a prima acie business situs within the state and could be
taxed, after deduction of lawful claims of sister states. Judgment reversed and case
remanded. In re Wheeling Steel Corporation Assessment, 177 S. E. 535 (W. Va.
1934).
The instant case is aptly illustrative of some of the difficulties which confront the
courts when called upon to define the bounds of state taxation. Fundamentally, the
exercise of the sovereign power to tax is limited in its operation to persons,1 prop-
erty2 or businesss within the jurisdictional limits of the state. 4 Permanent5 absence
of these subjects of taxation from the protecting arm of the state renders the at-
tempted' exercise of the power an usurpation and therefore violative of the require-
21. "A part of a will which is non-dispositive may be omitted from probate for
sufficient reasons, as where it is libelous." 1 PAoE, WiLLs (2d ed. 1928) § 527.
22. But see Freifield, supra note 13 at 302.
1. Residence, as distinguished from domicile, forms the basis for a per capita tax.
Haavik v. Alaska Packers' Assn., 263 U. S. 510 (1924) (poll tax on person temporarily
residing within the jurisdiction for the purpose of prosecuting a seasonal busfiess).
2. This note is restricted to personalty and is not concerned with realty. The latter
is taxable where it is located. KnwAN, REsnmxcE AN DozncmE (1934) 712. But per-
sonal liability for non-payment of realty taxes may not be enforced against a non-resident.
Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 (1899).
3. See note 14, infra.
4. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bofids, 82 U. S. 300 (1873); Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925); Rhode
Island H6spital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926) (this is so whether the tax be
upon property or an inheritance tax); Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158 (1933);
1 W aVnox, CoNrrcr oF LAws (3d ed. 1905) 163. These authorities, although dealing
with both tangible and intangible personal property, recognize this jurisdictional pre-
requisite. The vital distinction between these two classes of property must, however, be
constantly borne in mind. This distinction will be developed in the text.
5. "Using the language of domicil, which now so frequently is applied to inanimate
things, the state of origin remains the permanent situs of the property, notwithstanding
its occasional excursions to foreign parts." Holmes, J. in New York Central R. R. v.
Miller, 202 U. S. 584, 597 (1906).
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ments of due process.6 It is accordingly held that tangibles are taxable at the place
of their situs without regard to the domicile of the owner.7 However, acquisition of
a situs independent of the domiciliary state of the owner prevents taxation at the
latter place.S To apply the fictional maxim nobilia sequuntur personamO under such
circumstances would work undue hardship and it is therefore correctly disregardedlO
under the settled rule in fictione juris scm per acqudtas cxalstit.l The legal concept
that movables are situate at the domicile of the owner, more expediently lends itself,
at the present time, in its application to the elusive nature of intangiblesI- in the
6. The leading case is Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194
(1905). Due process is now the basis for objections urged against the jurisdictional power
to tax. But the principle was recognized before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 58 U. S. 596 (1355). In State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds,
82 U. S. 300 (1S73), the principle was recognized as an "obvious proposition" although the
dynamic potentialities of the "due process" clause were not felt by the court at that time.
There it was also held that a tax on bonds owned by a non-resident impaired the obliga-
tions of contracts. Taxes having this objectionable feature cannot be upheld. Murray v.
Charleston, 96 U. S. 432 (1877); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582 (1931); cf. Orr v. Gil-
man, 183 U. S. 278 (1902).
7. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112 (1934). This is so even
though the subject taxed is an instrumentality or vehicle of interstate commerce, provided
of course, it has in all other respects acquired a taxable situs and provided the method of
valuation is fair. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); Union
Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249r U. S. 275 (1919) (wherein the track mileage bass of valua-
tion allowed in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, was disapproved); John-
son Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158 (1933). The unit rule of valuation is discu-ed in
2 Coo=, TA-XATi ON (4th ed. 1924) 1656 et seq.
8. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Frick v. Penn-
sylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928) (money in safe
deposit box outside the state is not subject to an inheritance tax) ; cf. New York Central R.
R. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (1906). These cases completely repudiated a dictum to the
contrary in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 204 (1903). Federal power is not so
limited because its sphere of protection extends extraterritorially. United States v.
Bennett, 232 U. S. 299 (1914); Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
9. Bioom's LmAL Lcmts (7th Eng. Ed. 1900) 103. For an unusual decision holding
that a feme covert living amicably with her husband may nevertheless maintain a separate
domicile of her own for purposes of taxation (and impliedly, for any other purpo:L), sae
Commonwealth v. Rutherfoord, 169 S. E. 909 (Va. 1933).
10. But movables not acquiring an actual situs elsewhere remain at the domicile of the
owner, although without the actual confines of the state. Southern Pacific Co. v. Com-
monwealth of Ky., 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
11. Leford's Case, 11 Co. 46b, 51a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1206, 1216 (K. B. 1614); Bnoo's
LzAM. MLwmis (7th Eng. ed. 1900) 103; 3 Bl. Comm. *43, *283.
12. See cases cited in note 13, infra. The effect of these decisions is to render the de-
termination of domicile a matter of prime importance. KrN,;, op. cit. sura note 2, at
725. The rule in England is otherwise. There, intangibles are situate at the residence of the
debtor or where they may properly be enforced. Dicr, Co-,r-rcr or LAws (5th ed. 1932)
341. Not infrequently it has been stated that bonds, securities, and other evidences of
indebtedness have by usage acquired attributes of tangibility. State Tax on Foreign-Held
Bonds, 82 U. S. 300, 323, 324 (1873); New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 322, 323
(1899) ; Blackstone v. Mler, 188 U. S. 189, 206 (1903) ; Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 403
(1907); Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 439 (1914); cf. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S.
1 (1928). This appears to be the settled rule in England. Dr , op. cit. supra 342, 343.
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determination of situs and it is accordingly so applied.13 But again, a literal applica-
tion of this fiction will not be permitted to preclude the taxation of such property
by a state in which a business situs has been acquired. 14 Whether in the latter con-
tingency the domiciliary state of the owner may also tax the same intangibles is
not altogether settled.15 In conformity with the principles governing tangible per-
sonal property, there is a decided tendency to deny to the state of the owner's
domicile the right to tax intangibles having a business situs elsewhere, 10 although a
contrary view finds support in many judicial utterances. 17
A business situs is acquired when credits and open accounts arise from18 and are
In America the doctrine has been repudiated as constitutionally unsound. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930);
First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
13. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U. S. 300 (1873); Citizens Nat. Bank v. Durr,
257 U. S. 99 (1921); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926);
cf. Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898). The evil of
double taxation is as much present whether the tax be on a transfer of property by
descent or distribution or a tax on the property itself. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930), overruling Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903).
And see subsequent cases cited in note 12 supra. Cf. Guarantee Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287
U. S. 509 (1933). But see Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 305.
14. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New
Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (1907) (this is so even though the evidences of indebtedneM are
outside the state); Southern Realty Corp. v. McCallum, I F. Supp. 614 (W. D. Tex. 1932);
2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1031; cf. Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U.
S. 1 (1930); Beckell v. Lee, 5 F. Supp. (N. D. Fla. 1934).
15. In Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 211-213 (1930) a pro-
nounced tendency to discountenance double taxation was displayed by the court, It being
pointed out that the same reasons which forbid double taxation of tangibles are equally
applicable to intangibles. The specific problem was left open, however, and has not since
been squarely presented to the Court. See also First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312,
331 (1932).
16. See note 15, supra. Miami Coal Co. v. Fox, 203 Ind. 99, 176 N. E. 11 (1931); Buck
v. Miami County, 103 Kan. 270, 173 Pac. 344 (1918) ; Commissioner v. B. F. Avery & Sons,
163 Ky. 828, 174 S. W. 518 (1915); State ex rel. Rankin v. Harrington, 68 Mont. 1, 217
Pac. 681 (1923); cf. Poppleton. v. Yamhill County, 18 Ore. 377, 23 Pac. 253 (1890);
Lowndes, Bases of Jurisdiction in State Taxation of Inheritances and Property (1931) 29
Mic. L. Rxv. 850.
17. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54 (1917); Cream of Wheat
Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325 (1920); Citizens Nat. Bank v. Durr, 257 U.
S. 99 (1921); Rounds & Porter Lumber Co. v. Livesay, 66 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 10th,
1933); 2 COOLLY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1041; see Lawrence v. State Tax Comm. 286
U. S. 276, 280 (1932).
18. On principle there should be no difference whether the local office is given the
power to direct and control these intangibles, as a part of its local business, or whether the
home office retains exclusive control over the same. Bertron v. New Orleans, 131 La. 73,
59 So. 19 (1912); Bemis Bro. Bag Co. v. Louisiana Tax Comm., 158 La, 1, 103 So. 337




used as a part of' 9 the continuous20 operation of a local business apart from the
domicile of the owner or creditor.21 Mere transmission of evidences of indebtedness
to a local agent for purposes of collection or safekeeping is insufficient.na The taxa-
tion of intangibles which have acquired a business situs is usually permitted under
statutes providing for taxation of property within the jurisdiction.n- It has been
held, however, that they are not so taxable unless the particular statute evinces a
clear intent by the legislature to abrogate the common law rule that inobilia scquunitur
personam.2 4 In the principal case the constitutional requirement that a deduction be
made from the assessment of the value of such intangibles as were taxable in other
jurisdictions was properly recognized. The mere conduct of all or a greater portion
of the business of a corporation in a state other than that of its incorporation does
not effect a change of domicile so as to subject all of its intangible property to
taxation at the former state, in the absence of an acquired business situs therein.p
It is to be regretted, however, that the learned court in the instant case did not
clearly define the constitutional restrictions that would necessarily govern on a re-
trial Pertinent facts would have to be educed in order to determine to what extent,
if at all, these intangibles had acquired a situs in other jurisdictions wherein sales
agencies and manufacturing plants were located. It is suggested that a more concrete
analysis of the jurisdictional features involved would have done much to lessen the
complexity usually attendant upon fact situations of this nature.
19. In many cases it is held requisite that the local office be vested with the power to
direct and use the credits in the operation of the local business. Westinghouse Elem. &
Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 188 Cal. 491, 205 Pac. 1076 (1922); Crane Co. v. City
Council of Des Moines, 20S Iowa 164, 225 N. W. 344 (1929); Commissoner v. Kelly-
Springfield Tire Co., 38 Ohio App. 109, 175 N. E. 700 (1931). The "due process" clause,
however, does not require this limitation. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205
U. S. 395 (1907).
20. Isolated transactions do not constitute a business. Commonwealth v. Consolidated
Casualty Co., 170 Ky. 103, 185 S. W. 503 (1916); Gulley v. C. I. T. Corp., 150 So. 367
(Miss. 1933); Mlyers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 232, 12 N. E. 796 (1887).
21. State v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 188 Ala. 514, 66 So. 178 (1914); Matzen-
baugh v. People, 194 I. 108, 62 N. E. 546 (1901); Bluefields Banana Co. v. Board of
Assessors, 49 La. Ann. 43, 21 So. 627 (1897); National Leather Co. v. Commonwealth, 256
Mass. 419, 152 N. E. 916 (1926); Texas Land & Cattle Co. v. City of Fort Worth, 73 S.
W. (2d) 349 (Tex. C. C. A. 1934); Commonwealth v. United Cigarette Mach. Co., Ltd,
119 Va. 447, 89 S. E. 935 (1916).
22. Ewa Plantation Co. v. Wilder, 289 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Rent v. People,
201 Il. 469, 66 N. E. 242 (1903). But securities required by law to be deposited with a
state officer for the protection of residents are taxable because they become a necesary
adjunct of the business. People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 533 (1866); British Comm. Life
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 31 N. Y. 32 (1865); Western Assur. Co. v. Haliday, 126
Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903), cert. denied, 193 U. S. 673 (1904) semble; cf. Board of
Councilmen v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 129 Ky. 823, 112 S. W. 924 (1903).
23. But see cases cited in note 24, infra. Interesting questions of statutory construction
are elaborately considered in Note (1932) 76 A. L. R. 805, 822. See in general the cases
cited in notes 18-25, infra.
24. Commonwealth v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 796, 107 S. W.
233 (1908); Reliable Stores Corp. v. Detroit, 260 Mich. 2, 244 N. W. 203 (1932); Michelin
Tire Co. v. Hurlburt, 121 Ore. 110, 254 Pac. 196 (1927); Jamison v. Commonwealth, 120
Va. 137, 90 S. E. 640 (1916) (requiring localization of business within state by presence of
owner or agent); Crane Co. v. City Council of Des Moines, 208 Iowa 164, 225 N. W. 344
(1929) semble; State ex rte. Langer v. Packard, 40 N. D. 182, 168 N. W. 673 (1918) scrable.
25. Commonwealth v. Consolidated Casualty Co., 170 Ky. 103, 185 S. W. 503 (1916);
American Barge Line Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 246 Ky. 573, 55 S. W. (2d) 416 (1932).
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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-LABILITY To BENEPICIARIMIS
TnEREFOR.--The plaintiff, while on the premises of the defendant, the Bar Association
of the City of New York, to complain about the alleged misconduct of a member of
the bar, was injured by falling over a doorsill, defective as a result of the negligence
of the defendant's building superintendent. The defendant interposed the plea that
it was a charitable institution, and hence not liable to beneficiaries for the torts of
agents selected with due care. On motion to strike out the defense as insufficient in
law the plaintiff argued that the defendant's immunity from liability for torts of its
non-administrative agents does not extend to acts of its administrative agents. Held,
that the defendant's immunity embraces both classes of agents. Motion denied.
Stearns v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 154 Misc. 71, 276 N. Y.
Supp. 390 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
There has always been much confusion and conflict on the question of exempting
charitable corporations from liability for the acts of their agents and servants.'
Courts differ greatly both in the theories relied upon in support of the doctrine, and
in the nature and extent of its application. Where absolute immunity is granted it
is sometimes rested on the "trust funds" theory: that the funds of the corporation
are the subject of a charitable trust, and that to suffer a judgment to be recovered
against the institution would be an illegal diversion and waste of the estate.2 What
is thought by some courts to be a sounder doctrine is that of the "waiver" theory,
which stands on the fiction that one accepting the bounty of the institution impliedly
waives any claim of liability against it for the negligence of its agents and servants.3
Jurisdictions so holding, while denying compensation to beneficiaries, allow strangers
to recover.4 New York, however, has rejected both of these theories, and bas based
its conclusion that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply, on the so-called
independent contractor theory.5 The charitable institution is deemed not to act
1. See notes 2, 3, 5, infra.
2. This theory was probably first enunciated by Lord Cottenham writing for the Houso
of Lords in Herriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507, 8 Eng. Reprints 1508, 1510
(1846) where he said: "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply It to
those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a
completely different purpose." Union Pacific R. R. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 8th,
1894); Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 111. 381, 75 N. E. 991 (1905); Roosen v.
Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392 (1920); cf. Comment (1925)
34 YALi L. J. 316. But recovery was allowed in McInerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n of
Duluth, 122 Minn. 10, 141 N. W. 837 (1913) against the private funds of the Institution,
although the trust funds were exempted. New York rejected the "trust funds" theory In
Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. It. 626 (1910).
3. Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901);
Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S. W. 155
(1906) ; Thomas v. German General Benevolence Soc., 168 Cal.- 183, 141 Pac. 1186 (1914) ;
Weston Adm'rs v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 (1921);
McCaskill, Respondeat Superior as Applied in New York to Quasi-Public and Eleemosynary
Corporations (1920) 6 CORN. L. Q. 56. But this doctrine was rejected by New York In
Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924).
4. Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914); Gallon v.
House of Good Shepherd, 158 Mich. 361, 122 N. W. 631 (1909).
5. Schloendorff v. Society of N:Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); Matter
of Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N. Y. 268, 140 N. E. 694 (1923); Phllllp V.
Buffalo Gen. Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924); Hamburger v. Cornell UnI-
versity, 240 N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 539 (1925). This rule was extended to a railroad corpora-
tion maintaining its own private hospital on a non-profit basis, in State Industrial Board v.
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through the agency of its subordinates, but rather, merely to procure their services
for its beneficiaries. Recovery is allowed, however, when the injured person is a
stranger,6 or an employee of the institution.7 A beneficiary too, may recover, but
only in the event that he can show that the corporation failed to use due care in
selecting the negligent agent.8 As to a beneficiary, the fact that some remuneration
is made by him for the services rendered does not affect the exemption of the
institution. 9
In the instant case the somewhat novel distinction was proposed that, conceding
the absence of liability for the acts of non-administrative agents, this immunity does
not extend to liability for the acts of an administrative agent, such as the superinten-
dent of the building. The exemption as to non-administrative negligence being
firmly established in this state,' 0 the courts have often endeavored to place the
negligent act of an administrative agent within this rule rather than to determine
whether such a distinction would affect the result. Thus, no liability was incurred
through the negligence of a hospital orderly, on the ground that the distinction is not
one of title but of function, and that when the negligence occurred, he was acting
as a non-administrative agent, a nurse.'1  In the most recent case in New York
on the subject, Mills v. Society of the New York Hospital,12 the trial judge held the
hospital liable squarely on the basis that the negligence complained of was that of an
administrative agent; but the Appellate Division, refusing to decide the responsibility
for an administrative agent, held the act to be a non-administrative one, and reversed
the judgment on that ground. The court did say, however, "We do find dicta to the
effect that a benevolent institution might be liable for the administrative acts of its
employees." 13 It then considered Hamburgcr v. Cornell Unhersity,14 in which case
N. Y. Cent. R. R., 254 N. Y. 349, 173 N. E. 218 (1930). But this extension was criticized
in Mills v. Society of N. Y. Hospital, 242 App. Div. 245, 274 N. Y. Supp. 233 (2d Dep't
1934).
6. Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910); Kellogg v. Church
Charity Foundation, 203 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E. 406 (1911); Murtha v. N. Y. H. AT. C. and
Flower Hospital, 228 N. Y. 183, 126 N. E. 722 (1920).
7. Gartland v. New York Zoalogical Soc., 147 Misc. 230, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct.
App. Term 1909).
8. Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924); Hamburger
v. Cornell University, 240 N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 539 (1925).
9. In Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 129, 105 N. E. 92, 93 (1914)
Cardozo, J. stated, "Such a payment is regarded as a contribution to the income of the
hospital to be devoted, like its other funds, to the maintenance of the charity." Powers
v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901); McDonald v.
Mlassachusetts Gen. Hospital, 120 Mlass. 432 (1876); Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mlich.
555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894).
i0. Collins v. N. Y. Post Graduate Medical School, 59 App. Div. 63, 69 N. Y. Supp.
106 (2d Dep't 1901); cases cited in note 5 supra.
11. Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, 239 N. Y. ISS, 146 N. E. 199 (1924).
12. 242 App. Div. 245, 274 N. Y. Supp. 233 (2d Dep't 1934).
13. Id. at page 262, 274 N. Y. Supp. at 240. The court failed to mention such dicta.
However, see Brown v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 222 App. Div. 402, 405, 226 N. Y. Supp.
317, 320 (3d Dep't 1928). But see Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 190,
146 N. E. 199, 200 (1924); cf. Corbett v. St. Vincent Industrial School, 177 N. Y. 16, 163
N. E. 997 (1903), where a criminal, sentenced under the law to a charitable institution not
maintained by the municipality, was denied recovery for administrative negligence solely on
the ground that the institution was performing a governmental function delegated to it
by the state.
14. 240 N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 538 (1925), cited note 5, supra.
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the Appellate Division had decided that there was no liability for either administra-
tive or non-administrative negligence. Justice Cardozo, however, said 15 that the
Court of Appeals did not adopt the holding of the lower court that administrative
negligence could not result in liability, maintaining the question was still open in this
state. He explained that such holding was based on the "trust funds" theory, and
that New York had rejected that doctrine.' 0
Although New York is undecided, other jurisdictions appear to disregard the
existence of such a distinction, and grant immunity even though the act be an ad-
ministrative one.' 7 Thus charitable corporations chargeable with administrative
negligence have been held not liable to a student for the fall of a chimney on him,18
to an inmate for the collapse of a fire escape, 19 or to a pupil for the statutory
negligence of failure to provide fire escapes. 20 However those jurisdictions rely upon
either the "trust funds" theory or the "waiver" theory, and under such reasoning it
is obvious that the distinction alluded to could not have any weight, for under the
former the trust funds cannot be diverted by any beneficiary, and under the
"waiver" theory, the beneficiary is conclusively presumed to have waived all recourse
against the institution. Under the New York theory, however, the point is more
arguable. It might be maintained that the relationship between a beneficiary and a
doctor, for example, is direct, and so the latter is not to be deemed the agent of the
corporation, whereas a porter or other ministerial agent, who rarely comes into con.
tact with the beneficiary, but is intimately connected with the institution, would
more properly be regarded as acting for it. It is suggested that the rule, refusing
as it does to adopt this distinction, is of such long standing and of such proven worth
that it should not be curtailed in its purpose by such a technical objection. The
charitable institution should not have the fear of liability deter it from its acts of
benevolence.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURIES CAUSED BY THIRD PARTIES AND PHY-
SICIAN'S MALPRACTICE.-Plaintiff received a cut on his right wrist in the course of
his employment. The clinic of his employer's insurance carrier negligently treated
the wound and a one-third permanent loss of use of the right hand resulted. After
receiving $3,500 in settlement of a malpractice action against the insurance carrier
and its clinic, plaintiff received an award of compensation covering the full damages
suffered, which the compensation board and referee arbitrarily found to be entirely
due to the original cut. In a proceeding brought under the Compensation Law
against the employer and insurance carrier, the defendants offered proof of the
relation between the injuries, and the extent to which plaintiff was affected by each,
asserting that they should be credited, at least in part, with the settlement. Such
proof was rejected by the board and referee. On appeal, held, that the award be
affirmed. Two judges dissented. Parchefsky v. Kroll Brothers, 242 App. Div. 346,
275 N. Y. Supp. 322 (3d Dep't 1934).
This decision, enabling the plaintiff to mulct the defendant insurance carrier
15. Id. at 335, 148 N. E. at 541.
1,6. Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910) cited note 2, supra.
17. Currier v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 117 Fed. 44 (C. C. A. 1st, 1902);
Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465, 86 N. E. 909 (1909); Abston v. Waldon
Academy, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351 (1907).
18. Currier v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 117 Fed. 44 (C. C. A. 1st, 1902).
19. Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465, 86 N. E. 909 (1909).
20. Abston v. Waldon Academy, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351 (1907).
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doubly for at least part of his damages,1 is contrary to the ivell founded rule that
double recovery is abhorrent to sound law and justice. The court founds its con-
clusion on the inapplicability of Section 29 of the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law; 2 the fact that the employer and the clinic were not joint tort-feasors;
and the lack of any proof to show that the compensation award included damages
resulting from the clinic's negligence. The last point apparently indicates an over-
sight by the court because the award covered all of the employee's injuries and was
made after the malpractice occurred. Also, the defendants were precluded from
entering proof of the extent of the respective injuries. Of more legal significance,
however, is the second premise and the reasoning therefrom. That the employer
and the malpractitioner were not joint tort-feasors, is technically correct and well
supported by authority5 The employer is not technically or necessarily a tort-
feasor because his liability under the compensation law is predicated on the mere
relationship of master and servant.4 However, it does not follow, as the court held,
that the employment injury and the clinic's aggravation thereof are totally inde-
pendent acts. Compensation liability covers the original injury and such damages
as proximately flow therefrom. 5 To determine proximity, the tort doctrine of
proximate causation has been adopted.0 Under this doctrine, in tort actions, liability
1. It has been held that workmen's compensation awards are to be regarded as occupa-
tional insurance, and like general insurance, not deductible from claims made against
negligent third parties. Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 37 N. M. 479, 24 P.
(2d) 731 (1933); McDowell v. Rockey, 32 Ohio App. 26, 167 N. E. 589 (1929). However,
the New York Court of Appeals in Marhoffer v. Marboffer, 220 N. Y. 543, 116 N. E. 379
(1917), held that the New York theory of compensation was not indemnity but com-
pensation. As a result, the insurance doctrine was not applicable to the case under review.
2. As amended by Laws of 1934, c. 695. The court said that the above section applied
"solely to suits against third parties causing the injuries." Apparently the court meant
solely to instances where the original injury was caused by a third party. The New York
Court of Appeals has not passed on this point, but two prior Appellate Divi ion cases
decide it by implication. Hoehn v. Schenck, 221 App. Div. 371, 223 N. Y. Supp. 418 (2d
Dep't 1927); White v. Matthews, 221 App. Div. 551, 224 N. Y. Supp. 559 (lst Dep't
1927). A like construction has been put upon a similar statutory provision by the courts
of at least one other state. Smith v. Batties Fuel & Bldg. Material Co., 204 Mich. 9, 169
N. W. 943 (1918); Wood v. Vroman, 215 Mich. 449, 184 N. W. 520 (1920). The weight
of authority, however, appears to be to the contrary. Vatalaro v. Thomas, 262 Mass. 35,
160 N. E. 269 (1928); Polucha v. Landes, 60 N. D. 159, 233 N. W. 264 (1930) ; Williams
v. Dale, 139 Ore. 105, 8 P. (2d) 578 (1932) ; Revell v. McCaughan, 162 Tenn. 532, 39 S. W.
(2d) 269 (1931); Mitchell v. Dillingham, 22 S. W. (2d) 971 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
3. Smith v. Golden State Hospital, 296 Pac. 127 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1931); Ruth v.
Witherspoon-Englar Co., 98 Kan. 179, 157 Pac. 403 (1916); Viita v. Dolan, 132 Blinn. 128,
155 N. W. 1077 (1916); Hoehan v. Schenck, 221 App. Div. 371, 223 N. Y. Supp. 418 (2d
Dep't 1927); roffman v. Houston Clinic, 41 S. W. (2d) 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
4. Verschleiser v. Stem & Son, 229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126 (1920); McNeely v.
Carolina Asbestos Co., 206 N. C. 568, 174 S. E. 509 (1934); (1935) 4 FORDna L. Rv.
147; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., v. Jordan, 140 Okla. 238, 283 Pac. 240 (1929).
5. Vatalaro v. Thomas, 262 Mass. 383, 160 N. E. 269 (1928); Truka v. McDonald, 257
N. W. 232 (Neb. 1934); Phillips v. Holmes E.xpress Co., 229 N. Y. 527,-129 N. E. 901
(1920); Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 243 N. Y. 93, 161 N. E. 431 (1928); Polucha
v. Landes, 60 N. D. 159, 233 N. W. 264 (1930); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 148 Okla.
28, 296 Pac. 977 (1931); Note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1276.
6. Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 531, 108 N. E. 466, 468 (1915); Polucha v. Landes,
60 N. D. 159, 167, 233 N. W. 264, 267 (1930).
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for the negligence of a prudently chosen physician, has generally been thrust upon
the original tort-feasor.7 In a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals,
wherein a malpractitioner was held released by a full release given to the original
tort-feasor, Mr. Justice Lehman wrote: "It may be argued that the original wrong-
doer who caused the injury and the physician whose negligence aggravated the
injury are not, in technical sense, joint tort feasors. Nevertheless their wrongs
coalesced and resulted in damage which would not have been sustained but for the
original injury."s  The soundness of this can hardly be questioned, and with few
exceptions, employers have been held liable in compensation for any aggravation
caused by the negligence of physicians in treating employment injuries.0 Since the
tort doctrine of proximate causation has been adopted, quite justly, to impose the
additional liability on the employer, it would seem entirely fair and clearly logical
that the rules concerning release of tort-feasors should also be adopted. Such rules
provide that partial or total satisfaction by one tort-feasor may be shown by a joint
tort-feasor in mitigation of damages or in bar of the action,10 so that while "there
may be several suits and recoveries, there can be but one satisfaction"11 for the
hurt. Thus a settlement with or full release of the physician would not defeat the
employee from recovering compensation for the employment hurt alone, because the
physician is liable only for the results of his malpractice12 and the release would
thus not cover the full damages. Likewise, a compensation award based on the
total injuries would not defeat an action against the negligent physician because such
an award is an arbitrary one and does not, as was indicated in the instant case,
include an allowance for pain and suffering,1a for at least part of which the negligent
7. Gray v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 143, 102 N. E. 71 (1913); Wagner v.
Mittendorf, 232 N. Y. 481, 134 N. E. 539 (1922); Martin v. Cunningham, 93 Wash. 517,
161 Pac. 355 (1916); Retelle v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 211 N. W. 756 (1927); contra:
Pederson v. Eppard, 181 Minn. 47, 231 N. W. 393 (1930).
8. Milks v. McIver, 264 N. Y. 267, 269, 190 N. E. 487, 488 (1934).
9. Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928); Roman v.
Smith, 42 F. (2d) 931 (N. D. Idaho, 1930); Vatalaro v. Thomas, 262 Mass, 383, 160
N. E. 269 (1928); Polucha v. Landes, 60 N. D. 159, 233 N. W. 264 (1930); Brown v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 86 Okla. 143, 206 Pac. 1042 (1922); Revell v. McCaughan, 162 Tenn.
532, 39 S. W. (2d) 269 (1931) (ordinarily liability would not cover malpractice aggravation
but compensation law provisions change rule); Mitchell v. Dillingham, 22 S, W. (2d) 971
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Ross v. Erickson Construction Co., 89 Wash. 634, 155 Pac. 153
(1916); contra: Ruth v. Witherspoon-Englar Co., 98 Kan. 179, 157 Pac. 403 (1916);
Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N. W. 1077 (1916). The New York Court of Appeals
has not decided the question, but Milks v. McIver, 264 N .Y. 267, 190 N. E. 487 (1934)
indicates that the employer would be held. White v. Matthews, 221 App. Div. 551, 554,
224 N. Y. Supp. 559, 564 (Ist Dep't 1927) also indicates that liability covers the malpractice.
However, cf. Ader v. Blau, 241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771 (1925); Hoehn v. Schenck, 221 App.
Div. 371, 223 N. Y. Supp. 418 (2d Dep't 1927).
10. Berkeley v. Wilson, 87 Md. 219, 39 AtI. 502 (1898); Knapp v. Roche, 94 N. Y.
329 (1884) ; Stires v. Sherwood, 75 Ore. 108, 145 Pac. 645 (1915) ; Hooyman v. Reeve, 168
Vis. 420, 170 N. W. 282 (1919).
11. Walsh v. New Y.ork C. & H. R. R. Co., 204 N. Y. 58, 62, 97 N. E. 408, 410 (1912).
12. Wenger v. Calder, 78 Ill. 275 (1875); Chilton v. Rails, 220 Mo. App. 355, 286
S. W. 718 (1926); Miller v. Frey, 49 Neb. 472, 68 N. W. 630 (1896); Cranford v. O'Shea,
83 Wash. 508, 145 Pac. 579 (1915); see Milks v. McIver, 264 N. Y. 267, 269, 190 N. E.
487, 488 (1934).




physician is liable. While the application of this doctrine would appear to be simple
and just, no such clearly defined rules can be gleaned from the decisions on the
subject. Statutory enactments or amendments appear necessary for clarification,
and in most instances the sections of the present compensation laws which relate
to injuries caused by third persons and for which compensation is payable, are
inadequate. They limit the employee's rights of recovery and ofttimes benefit the
negligent third party. The desired end is first, to give the employee compensation
based on the total injuries proximately resulting from his employment hurt,' 4
second, to enable the employee to obtain his full measure of damages by saving
his common law remedy against the third party,15 and third, to grant the employer
a right against the third party to recover any monies paid by reason of the latter's
wrongY6 It would be desirable for the various states to adopt legislation to fully
accomplish this end.
14. The cases cited in notes 5 and 9 supra indicate that the weight of authority now
imposes liability upon the employer for the proximate results of employment accidents.
15. A number of states allow the employee to elect whether he will take compensation from
his employer or sue the negligent third party for common law damages, but the Statutory
provisions and the judicial interpretations thereof are not adequate to meet all eventualities.
The provisions may be held inapplicable in certain cases. See note 2 supra. Where the
employee elects to take compensation, the employer is subrogated to his rights against the
third party and this may work to the employer's benefit and the employee's detriment.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N. Y. 273, 146 N. E. 377 (1925) (here
the court held that the employer or insurance carrier could collect the full claim from
the third party and hold as its own any monies over and above the amount of compensa-
tion paid). The subrogation may also work to the benefit of the third party. American
Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 160 Tenn. 248, 23 S. W. (2d) 245 (1930)
(here the court limited the third party's liability to the amount paid or payable by the
insurance carrier under the compensation award). The statutory provisions may grant
to the employee the excess recovered by the employer or insurance carrier over and above
its liability for compensation, but even though held applicable in cases involving da1-
practice, they are not wholly adequate. The inadequacy arises from the employer or
insurance carrier escaping all liability for the damages arising solely out of the employment
injury for which the negligent physician is not liable. N. D. Comm. LAws A.m. (Supp. 1925)
§ 396a (20). The most desirable provision would Seem to be one allowing a full com-
pensation recovery by the employee, and then allowing either the employer, the employee,
or both, to sue the negligent third party in common law, and out of any sum recovered,
reimburse the employer for his compensation expenditures resulting from the third party's
negligence plus any costs to the employer of prosecuting the action.
16. Where the employee recovers from the negligent third party and then requeSts a
compensation award, the employer should be held liable for compensation based Solely on
the employment injury.
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